Order LA04-08 - Dockets LA04002, LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013 - Planning Appeal - Quinn et al, Moore, Rankin and Guptill v. City of Summerside (Sep. 28, 2004)

Dockets: LA04002, LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013
Order LA04-08

IN THE MATTER of an appeal by Gerald Quinn, Laura Quinn, Nancy Guptill, Patricia Poirier, Al Poirier, George Roach, Charity Roach, Vivian Aho and Darlene Holt against a decision by the City of Summerside dated January 19, 2004, and appeals by John Moore, Richard Rankin and Gregg Guptill of a decision of the City of Summerside, dated April 14, 2004.

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

on Tuesday, the 28th day of September, 2004.

Brian J. McKenna, Vice-Chair
Kathy Kennedy, Commissioner
Anne Petley, Commissioner

Order

Contents

Appearances & Witnesses

Reasons for Order

1.    Introduction

2.    Discussion

3.    Findings

4.    Disposition

Order

Appearances & Witnesses

1.    For the Appellants

        Representatives:

Gregg Guptill
Richard Rankin
Barry Copeland

Witnesses:

Darlene Holt
Laura Quinn
Patricia Poirier
Nancy Guptill
Richard Savidant
Robert Boyer
Catherine Hennessey
Judith East
John Moore
Darlene Rhodenizer
Duke Cormier
Malcolm MacFarlane

2.    For the Respondent

Counsel:
Krista MacKay

Witnesses:
Geoffrey Millen
Thayne Jenkins
James Sackville

3.    For the Developer

Counsel:
Nancy Key, Q.C.

Witnesses:
Robert C. Tuck
Nicolle Morrison
Ane Huestis
Margo Thompson
William Chandler

Reasons for Order

1.  Introduction

[1] This is a consolidation of several appeals filed with the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the Commission) under section 28 of the Planning Act R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap P-8, (the Planning Act).

[2]  Appeal LA04002 was filed with the Commission on February 9, 2004 by Gerald Quinn, Laura Quinn, Nancy Guptill, Patricia Poirier, Al Poirier, George Roach, Charity Roach, Vivian Aho and Darlene Holt. This appeal concerns the January 19, 2004 decisions of the City of Summerside to approve official plan amendment OPA-A36-2004 of the City of Summerside Official Plan 1998 and zoning bylaw amendment SS-15-A47 of the City of Summerside Zoning Bylaw SS-15 to change the zoning from Medium Density Residential (R3) to High Density Residential (R4) for parcels 304964 [319 Notre Dame Street], 304972 [124 Central Street], 304980 [128 Central Street], 304808 [132 Central Street ]and a portion of 304824 [320 Convent Street], as well as an amendment pursuant to section 18.4 b. of the City of Summerside Zoning Bylaw SS-15 to approve a maximum building height of 56 feet with respect to the aforementioned parcels.

[3]   Appeals LA04011 (John Moore, filed May 4, 2004), LA04012 (Richard Rankin, filed May 5, 2004) and LA04013 (Gregg Guptill, filed May 5, 2004) all concern the decisions of the City of Summerside (the Respondent) dated April 14, 2004 to approve official plan amendment OPA-39-2004 to amend the City of Summerside Official Plan 1998(Official Plan) and zoning amendment SS-15-A52 of the City of Summerside Zoning Bylaw SS-15 (Zoning Bylaw) to change the zoning from Medium Density Residential (R3) to High Density Residential (R4) for parcel number 304956 [325 Notre Dame Street].

[4]   By way of background, the above decisions of the Respondent all relate to a 35 unit condominium project proposed by Nicolle Morrison and Ane Huestis (the Developers).

[5]   After public notice and suitable scheduling for the involved parties, appeal LA04002 was heard on May 17, 18, 19, 27 and 28, 2004. The parties requested that the Commission not issue an order on said appeal until after appeals LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013 had been heard. The Commission agreed with this approach. The Developer later requested that the order for appeal LA04002 be issued prior to the later appeals. However, as the Appellant and Respondent continued to agree to wait until all the appeals had been heard, the Commission maintained its decision to issue the present Order following the hearing of all four appeals. Written submissions on appeal LA04002 were to be filed by June 21, 2004, with the deadline for rebuttal submissions on June 28, 2004. At the request of the Appellants, these deadlines were extended for another week.

[6]   During the course of appeal LA04002, the Appellants Guptill and Moore filed appeals LA04018 and LA04019 respectively. In Order LA04-03 issued July 9, 2004, the Commission found that it did not have the jurisdiction to hear those appeals.

[7]   After public notice and suitable scheduling for the involved parties, appeals LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013 were heard on July 14 and 16, 2004.

2.  Discussion

Appellants' Submissions

LA04002 Quinn et al.

[8]   The Appellants filed lengthy written closing and rebuttal submissions. The Appellants request that the Commission allow the appeal and quash the decisions made by the Respondent on January 19, 2004 which pertain to this matter.

LA04011 Moore, LA04012 Rankin, LA04013 Guptill

[9]   The Appellants set out their detailed grounds for appeal in each Notice of Appeal. Highlights of the Appellants oral closing arguments follow.

The Respondent's zoning bylaw does not deal with condominium developments such as the Developer's project. Accordingly, the Respondent's decisions cannot be said to be based on sound planning principles. The analysis prepared by staff prior to the Respondent's consideration of the requested amendments only pays "lip service" to the Respondent's Official Plan. An objective analysis would reveal that the development failed on 4 out of 9 criteria contained in the Respondent's zoning bylaw. The proposed development is inappropriate, the Respondent's decisions result from a "litany of fatal errors", the decisions reflect a "wanton disregard" for nearby residents, and the Respondent's decisions constitute a dangerous precedent.

The Respondent failed to consider its own adequacy and capability to accommodate such a development. Approval of the development does not accord with the Heritage Places Protection Act. The Respondent failed to follow its past precedents and did not consider the majority opinion of nearby residents (88 percent within a 60 metre radius) who were opposed to this development.

While 325 Notre Dame Street falls just outside the heritage area, the lots considered under appeal LA04002 do fall within the heritage area. Accordingly, a heritage assessment should have been done for all parcels required for this development as 325 Notre Dame Street is a supporting lot. In addition, the Heritage Planning Board which assessed the lots considered under appeal LA04002 was not properly constituted. Thus, the Respondent's council did not have a lawful Planning Board recommendation.

There is no need for additional R4 land in Summerside. Converting the lots considered under all four appeals from R3 to R4 is inconsistent with the Official Plan, particularly section 6.5 .2 (c) (iii). It is submitted that a "supporting ring" of residential development for the downtown core is contained within the C1 zone immediately north of the downtown. The lots which are the subject of this appeal are too far from the downtown to be considered "immediately north".

It is submitted that Judith East, a professional planner who appeared as a witness for the Appellants on Appeal LA04002, identified in her report and in her testimony that this development was inappropriate for the lots considered under all four appeals.

It is submitted that the Respondent has not conducted the statutory five year review of its official plan and the required annual reports were not prepared.

[10] The Appellants requested that the Commission allow the appeal and quash the Respondent's April 14, 2004 decisions pertaining to this matter.

Respondent's Submissions

[11] Following the hearing for appeal LA04002, the Respondent filed lengthy written closing and rebuttal submissions. Highlights of the oral closing arguments presented by the Respondent concerning appeals LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013, which are also applicable to LA04002, follow.

The Respondent followed all procedural requirements set out in its Zoning Bylaw. A public notice was published and public meetings were held. The Respondent considered the criteria set out under section 4.7 of the Zoning Bylaw.

The opinions of nearby residents are only one of many factors to be considered by the Respondent in making a decision to approve a change in zoning. The Respondent considers the merits of a rezoning application in their entirety.

Sections 2, 6 and 7 of the Official Plan support high density housing. The Official Plan does refer to condominiums. It is submitted that the only difference between a condominium and an apartment is one of ownership.

With respect to section 6.5 .2 (c) (iii) of the Official Plan, there are varying opinions as to how far north the "downtown" extends, and thus the expression "immediately north of the downtown" is subject to interpretation. It is the position of the Respondent's staff that the parcels that are the subject of all four appeals are immediately north of the downtown.

It is submitted that a review by the Heritage Planning Board was not required for 325 Notre Dame Street. With respect to the other parcels which fall inside the heritage district, it is submitted that a Heritage Impact Assessment was performed. While there was an error in the original appointment of the Heritage Planning Board, in that said Board was originally appointed by the Respondent's mayor rather than by its council, this error is now corrected as the Respondent's council retroactively confirmed this appointment in July 2004. A retroactive confirmation of appointments is often used by corporations and it is submitted that such a process is an appropriate corrective step for the Respondent, given that the Respondent is a corporation pursuant to section 16 of the City of Summerside Act.

It is submitted that the requirement to file annual reports has nothing to do with the Respondent's decisions made on a rezoning application.

[12]  The Respondent requests that the Commission deny all four appeals concerning this matter.

Developers' Submissions

[13]   Following the hearing for appeal LA04002, the Respondent filed written closing and rebuttal submissions. Highlights of the oral closing arguments presented by the Developers concerning appeals LA04011, LA04012 and LA04013, which are also applicable to LA04002, follow.

It is submitted that the Respondent did follow the requirements of its Zoning Bylaw in considering this matter.

The rezoning of these parcels is supported by the Respondent's Official Plan.

In the event of any conflict between the Zoning Bylaw and the Official Plan, the Official Plan is paramount.

[14]   The Developers request that the Commission deny all four appeals pertaining to this matter.

3. Findings

[15]   After a careful review of the evidence, the submissions of the parties, and the applicable law, it is the decision of the Commission to deny these appeals. The reasons for the Commission's decision follow.

[16]   Subsection 28(1) of the Planning Act reads as follows:

28. (1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), any person who is dissatisfied by a decision of a council or the Minister in respect of the administration of regulations or bylaws made pursuant to the powers conferred by this Act may, within twenty-one days of the decision appeal to the Commission.

[17]   Appeals under the Planning Act generally take the form of a hearing de novo before the Commission. In an often cited decision which provides considerable guidance to the Commission, In the matter of Section 14(1) of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act (Stated Case), [1997] 2 P.E.I.R. 40 (PEISCAD), Mitchell, J.A. states for the Court at page 7:

it becomes apparent that the Legislature contemplated and intended that appeals under the Planning Act would take the form of a hearing de novo after which IRAC, if it so decided, could substitute its decision for the one appealed. The findings of the person or body appealed from are irrelevant. IRAC must hear and decide the matter anew as if it were the original decision-maker.

[18]   In previous appeals, the Commission has found that it does have the power to substitute its decision for that of the person or body appealed from. Such discretion should be exercised carefully. The Commission ought not to interfere with a decision merely because it disagrees with the end result. However, if the person or body appealed from did not follow the proper procedures or apply sound planning principles in considering an application made under a bylaw made pursuant to the powers conferred by the Planning Act, then the Commission must proceed to review the evidence before it to determine whether or not the application should succeed.

[19] The Commission finds that the above-cited principle, originally applied to decisions concerning building or development permits, and later applied to applications for variances, applies equally where a municipal decision making body, such as the Respondent's council, approves an application for rezoning pursuant to its Bylaw. Thus, a two-part test is invoked:

whether the municipal authority, in this case the Respondent, followed the proper procedures as required in its Bylaw in making a decision to approve the requested rezoning; and

Whether the proposed use for the rezoning has merit based on sound planning principles.

[20]  The Appellants' written submission, filed on June 28, 2004 following the hearing of appeal LA04002 raises the following procedural concerns:

           PROCEDURAL IMPROPRIETIES

1. Conflict of Interest: Councilor Barry Chappell, abstained from voting on the proposal on January 19th, 2004, finally recognizing his conflict, but not before supporting the proposal in Council meetings. This is a clear conflict of interest and Mr. Chappell should have excused himself completely from the review of this application.

2. Failure to appoint Heritage Planning Board: The Heritage Plan and Bylaw requires City Council to appoint a Heritage Planning Board consisting of three council members and three citizen members. The Plan states that this Board will have the functions of a Planning Board under the PEI Planning Act. Given that Council did not appoint citizen members by way of resolution, the City has never appointed a Heritage Planning Board.

3. Failure to follow Precedent and City Protocol: Six previous applications for rezoning between 2000 and 2003 were defeated based, in all cases, on recognition by Council that strong opposition of community residents was sufficient reason to defeat the proposals. Technical Services reported to Council that 24 property owners in the neighborhood were opposed.

Consistent with practice throughout Canada, Municipal Councils operate in a Quasi Judicial manner. Therefore, contrary to Councilor Lyle's position that "bylaws were made to be amended" - bylaws are made to be upheld and enforced.

The City's Protocol, while formally adopted subsequent to the January 19th Council decision, is consistent with decades of public decision making practice that insures the absence of bias in matters such as this. The City's Protocol on Rezonings and Other Land-Use Applications fully recognizes this in Policy # 9:

"City elected officials will take care not to create any apprehensions of bias at public meetings or Planning Board meetings that they have already reached a final, unalterable opinion on the application, prior to discussion and final determination by full Council."

This Protocol further includes Policy # 13:

"In making a final determination on a rezoning application, Council will weigh the relative distribution and significance of costs and benefits from a development project that may accrue among different stakeholders groups" ...

In this case, the lion's share of negative costs are borne by residents in the immediate buffer zone and residents in nearby areas through loss of enjoyment of their property (shadowing); potentially diminished property values; and intrusion of a massive structure that is grossly out of scale with the surrounding Heritage District.

The "relative distribution of costs and benefits" in this case is overwhelmingly in favor of the developer at the expense of virtually every other stakeholder group.

4. Questionable / Inaccurate Site Plan Review Criteria: The Zoning Bylaw requires application review according to criteria in place when an application is completed. The problem with respect to the public interest, is that development standards (review criteria) were changed by the City during consideration of this development proposal.

Criteria in place when the development proposal was first discussed were provided to the applicant on March 24, 2003.

On August 11, 2003, the Development Officer recommended the R4 zone "text amendments" and explained to the Planning Board that "earlier we had a developer wanting to do an apartment project ..."

Thus, the October 28th, 2003 amendments are clearly aimed at allowing this proposal to proceed.

These amendments were made specifically to allow a much larger building on a smaller lot in the R-4 zone

A significant change in amendment # 3 of the "text amendments" (encroachments into minimum required yards) received no public scrutiny at all.

This set of amendments dramatically increased the allowable intensity of use in the R-4 zone and allowable encroachments into minimum required yards.

New criteria became part of the zoning bylaw on October 28, 2003

Criteria on which the proposal was evaluated allow much greater intensity of use and yard encroachment in the R-4 zone.

Review of this proposal is based on a far greater intensity of use than existed in the Zoning Bylaw during early interactions between the developer and the Development Officer.

The analysis of any of these amendments did not meet the standards for a zoning amendment:

1. Being in accordance with the Official Plan.
2. Providing a public benefit.
3. Addressing a new or changed condition.
4. Correcting a mistake.

Conflict of Interest

[21] With respect to the alleged conflict of interest issue raised by the Appellants, the Commission notes that Councillor Chappell did abstain from voting on January 19, 2004. Further, the Respondent's Protocol had not been adopted at that time. According to the evidence of one of the Developers presented at the hearing, it was revealed that Councillor Chappell is married to her husband's father's sister. The Commission finds that this relationship is too remote to establish a conflict of interest or a reasonable apprehension of bias. With respect to the statements of Councillor Chappell in the local press which were presented in evidence, the Commission finds that these statements do not establish a conflict of interest or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Failure to appoint Heritage Planning Board

[22] The Commission notes that the Respondent has conceded in its rebuttal submission that

"It appears that the Appellants are correct when they state that the Heritage Planning Board was appointed by the Mayor on December 8, 2003 and not by Council Resolution as required under section 3.3(b)(ii) of the Heritage Conservation Bylaw SS-20."

The Respondent also advised in its rebuttal submission that it held an emergency council meeting on July 5, 2004 at which time the Respondent's council ratified the appointment of all members of the Heritage Planning Board, the Planning Board and also ratified the decisions of these boards since being appointed by the Mayor on December 8, 2003.

[23] The Commission is not satisfied that the Respondent has the jurisdiction to retroactively ratify these past decisions. While the Respondent is a corporation at law, its council is a political body, the municipal level of government. To enact legislation, let alone a municipal resolution, with retroactive effect is a tenuous matter at best and any final determination as to the validity of such action ultimately rests with the courts. While the Commission is of the opinion that errors in the appointment of the Heritage Planning Board did in fact occur, and that it is questionable as to whether the Respondent's council could retroactively ratify the decision of the Heritage Planning Board, the Commission has heard this matter de novo and "could substitute its decision for the one appealed". However, given that the Heritage Planning Board was improperly appointed at the time it considered the matter, and given that there is no record in the minutes that the Heritage Planning Board voted on a recommendation to the Respondent's council, the Commission makes the denial of these appeals conditional on the following:

The Respondent shall place these rezoning and maximum permissible height matters before its Heritage Planning Board and Planning Board, as applicable, for consideration. Following its consideration of these matters, the applicable Board shall then vote on the recommendations it will provide to the Respondent's council.

The Respondent's council shall then consider the recommendations of the applicable Board, reconsider these matters and vote on the matters.

Duly certified copies of all minutes and all resolutions resulting from the above cited requirements shall then be filed with the Commission. The Respondent shall provide copies of these documents directly to the representatives of the parties to these appeals.

Failure to follow Precedent and City Protocol

[24]  With respect to the allegation of "precedent", the Commission is not aware of any requirement in the Respondent's Zoning Bylaw, Official Plan or the Planning Act binding the Respondent's council to precedent.

[25] At the hearing of appeal LA04002, one of the Appellants testified that she believed the Respondent's failure to follow its past precedents was anti-democratic. The Commission notes that there are two main streams of democratic process: direct democracy and representative democracy. Under direct democracy, the elected representatives consider matters at "Town Hall" style meetings and decisions result based on the majority viewpoint of those present. Under representative democracy, elected representatives make decisions which are not necessarily in keeping with the views, stated personally or by petition, of the majority of the electorate. The electorate's ultimate recourse, under representative democracy, is through the ballot box. The Respondent's council functions as a representative democracy. The Commission finds that there is no evidence that the Respondent has violated democratic principles in these matters.

[26]  The Appellants have raised the matter of the Respondent's Protocol, Policy 13. While this policy was not in effect at the time of the Respondent's January 19, 2004 decision, it was in effect at the time of the April 14, 2004 decision. Subsection 28(1) of the Planning Act provides a right of appeal concerning the "administration of regulations or bylaws made pursuant to the powers conferred by this Act". The Protocol is neither a regulation nor a bylaw made pursuant to the powers conferred by the Planning Act. Indeed, neither the Planning Act, the Municipalities Act nor the City of Summerside Act refers to a "protocol" or "protocols". While the Protocol may serve as a set of guidelines for the Respondent, its role as an enforceable document, standing separate and apart from the Zoning Bylaw and the Official Plan, is questionable.

Questionable / Inaccurate Site Plan Review Criteria

[27] The Appellants have raised the matter of the "text amendments" which were the subject of Order LA04-03. The Commission notes that these "text amendments" were part of the Respondent's Zoning Bylaw effective October 28, 2003, well before these matters appeared before the Respondent's Planning Board, Heritage Planning Board or Council. As stated in Order LA04-03, the Commission does not have the jurisdiction to hear an appeal of these amendments.

[28] The Commission notes that no building permit has yet been issued. Much of the testimony and evidence presented to the Commission concerned the nature of the proposed condominium apartment building. While this information was helpful as a background for the decision maker, be it the Respondent's council or the Commission hearing the matter de novo, much time and energy was spent by the parties, particularly the Appellants and Developers, in providing specific information concerning particulars of the building. Given that the issue at hand is the rezoning of several lots, and a discretionary increase in the maximum permissible height to allow for a proposed 35 unit 5 story condominium/apartment building, much of the exacting detail presented to the Commission was premature and ought to have awaited any issuance of a building permit.

[29] With respect to the issue of whether the proposed use for the rezoning has merit based on sound planning principles, the Commission notes that provisions of the Official Plan, particularly within sections 2 and 6 of that document, and portions of the Heritage Impact Assessment, can be cited both in favour and against the proposed 5 storey, 35 unit condominium/apartment building. To very briefly summarize, the Official Plan encourages a mix of different housing types, varying residential densities and various tenure (ownership) options while encouraging the conservation and enhancement of the social character, heritage buildings and natural environment, ensuring that new development is compatible with these values. The Commission is satisfied that the Respondent put its mind to the planning principles involved prior to making its decision.

[30]  While the Developers' proposed project is of a rather large mass and scale compared to adjacent residential buildings, its scale is not out of character with adjacent institutional buildings. Accordingly, the Commission finds that the mass and scale of the proposed project is acceptable, although its proposed mass and scale reflects the very upper limits for this neighbourhood. The Commission finds that the proposed project, properly executed, would provide a transition between the residential and institutional buildings. Whether the proposed project can be considered to be properly executed must await the issuance of a building permit specifying precise design parameters. Indeed, with respect to the project itself, the delicate balance between the varying policies and goals cannot be determined until a building permit is issued, conditional on a specific design with clearly specified dimensions.

[31] Concerns have been raised about, among other matters, the height of the building and the amount, if any, of projection of the "underground" garage above ground. The Appellants are concerned that the building will be at the maximum height of 56 feet, with the "underground" garage protruding 4 feet above ground. The Developers' architect testified that the garage would rise above the ground only 18 inches at the maximum end, and 6 inches at the minimum end, the difference resulting from the grade of the site. These concerns are better addressed at the time of issuance of a building permit.

[32] The Appellants also expressed concern that the Respondent's decision does not accord with the Heritage Places Protection Act. Subsection (8) of section 5 of the Heritage Places Protection Act R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap H-3.1 reads as follows:

(8) The owner of any property designated under this section or the municipality in which the property is located may appeal to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission against the decision of the Minister.

The Commission wishes to point out that its role is to hear appeals of decisions "in respect of the administration of regulations or bylaws made pursuant to the powers conferred by this Act", that is to say, the Planning Act. The Commission examines the Planning Act, regulations made under said Act for decisions of the Minister, the bylaws made under said Act and the official plan for decisions of a municipality. Whether or not a decision may be in violation of another statute is a matter for an appellate body with wider jurisdiction. While it is true that there is a right of appeal to the Commission under the Heritage Places Protection Act, that appeal is limited to the owner of a designated property or the municipality in which the property is located, and the nature of the decision which can be appealed to the Commission is the decision of the Minister to designate the property. The present matters do not fall within the narrow scope of appeal specified under the Heritage Places Protection Act.

[33] Subject to a correction of the procedural errors with respect to the appointment of the Heritage Planning Board and the Planning Board, and the apparent failure of the Heritage Planning Board to hold a vote, the Commission finds that the Respondent's decisions of January 19, 2004 and April 14, 2004 were reasonable. Accordingly, upon the Respondent satisfying the conditions specified in this Order, these four appeals are denied.

4. Disposition

[34]   An Order denying the appeals, conditional upon the satisfaction of the requirements set forth in this Order, will therefore be issued.

Order

WHEREAS Gerald Quinn, Laura Quinn, Nancy Guptill, Patricia Poirier, Al Poirier, George Roach, Charity Roach, Vivian Aho and Darlene Holt have appealed a decision of the City of Sumerside, dated January 19, 2004;

AND WHEREAS John Moore, Richard Rankin and Gregg Guptill have each filed appeals of a decision of the City of Summerside, dated April 14, 2004;

AND WHEREAS the Commission heard these appeals at public hearings conducted in Charlottetown on May 17, 18, 19, 27, 28 and July 14 and 16, 2004 after due public notice and suitable scheduling for the parties;

AND WHEREAS the Commission has issued its findings on these four appeals in accordance with the Reasons for Order issued with this Order;

NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act and the Planning Act

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. Conditional upon the satisfaction of the requirements set forth in the Reasons for Order issued with this Order, the appeals are denied.

DATED at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 28th day of September, 2004.

BY THE COMMISSION:

Brian J. McKenna, Vice-Chair

Kathy Kennedy, Commissioner

Anne Petley, Commissioner

NOTICE

Section 12 of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows:

12. The Commission may, in its absolute discretion, review, rescind or vary any order or decision made by it or rehear any application before deciding it.

Parties to this proceeding seeking a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing with the Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which clearly states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought.

Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows:

13.(1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court upon a question of law or jurisdiction.

(2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil Procedure Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes.