Docket LA97014
Order LA98-02
IN
THE MATTER of an appeal by Gary L. Paynter against a decision made
by the Minister of Community Affairs and Attorney General dated June 24, 1997.
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
on Tuesday, the 24th day of February, 1998.
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Debbie MacLellan, Commissioner
Order
Contents
Appearances & Witnesses
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
2. Discussion
3. Findings
4. Disposition
Order
Appearances &
Witnesses
Written
submissions were filed by:
1. For Gary L. Paynter
(the Appellant)
Gary L. Paynter
2. For the Minister
of Community Affairs and Attorney General (the Respondent)
Counsel:
Cyndria Wedge
Judith M. Haldemann
3. For the City of Charlottetown
Counsel:
David W. Hooley, Q.C.
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
This
Order and Reasons for Order pertains to preliminary matters only.
This is an appeal under the Planning
Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. 8 by Gary L. Paynter (the Appellant). By Notice of
Appeal dated July 2, 1997 the Appellant has appealed a decision made by the Minister of
Community Affairs and Attorney General (the Minister) to approve an amendment to the
Sherwood Zoning and Development Bylaw for the former Community of Sherwood (now part of
the City of Charlottetown). The amendment was to rezone 30 Hemlock Court from Residential
Two-Family (R2) to Commercial Retail (C1).
In a letter to the Commission dated July 14,
1997 Judith M. Haldemann, on behalf of the Minister, raised a preliminary matter arguing
that Mr. Paynter's appeal does not fall within the matters which may be appealed
under section 28 of the Planning Act.
In a subsequent letter to the Commission
dated July 30, 1997, Cyndria L. Wedge notified the Commission that she now represents the
Minister and further argues that the Minister's decision to approve the bylaw
amendment is not subject to appeal under section 28 of the Planning Act.
A hearing on this appeal was held in abeyance
while the Commission held hearings and rendered decisions on appeals filed by the
Appellant on separate but related decisions made by the City of Charlottetown.
By letter to all parties dated December 15,
1997, the Commission advised that it would proceed with a hearing on this preliminary
matter. The hearing was conducted by way of written submissions. The Commission received
written submissions on January 16, 1998 from David Hooley, Q.C. on behalf of the City,
Cyndria L. Wedge on behalf of the Minister and from Gary L. Paynter. Sonya Corrigan, the
property owner made no submissions. Although, the Commission provided an opportunity for
final written rebuttals from the parties, no rebuttals were submitted by any party.
2. Discussion
The Minister
The arguments for the Minister may be summarized as follows:
The Minister's position is that section 28 of the Planning
Act only allows appeals from a decision of a council or the Minister in
respect of the administration of regulations or bylaws.
The Minister submits that section 17 of the Planning Act
states that bylaws are made by council and are subject to the approval of the Minister.
Although this approval is discretionary, the approval of the Minister is more a formality.
The Minister contends that section 19 of the Planning Act
prescribes the procedure to make a bylaw and it is formally declared passed only after
being signed by the mayor or chairman, the administrator and the Minister. The Minister is
not involved in the actual adoption of the bylaw this is the responsibility of the
municipal council.
The Minister submits that the decision by the Minister to approve the
bylaw was made pursuant to section 17 of the Planning Act and
was not made in respect to the administration of the regulations or bylaws, therefore the
Commission has no jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The Minister adds that the
administration of the bylaws and the official plan for Sherwood is the responsibility of
the municipal council, not the Minister.
The Minister requests this appeal be dismissed.
The Appellant
The arguments for the Appellant may be summarized as follows:
The Appellant submits that any bylaw passed by a Municipal Council does
not have any force and effect until the Minister responsible for administration of the Planning
Act gives his approval. The Appellant contends municipal official plans, rezoning
and bylaw amendments are the final responsibility of the Minister and, in most cases, his
careful deliberation as to whether the amendments are consistent with the intent of the Planning
Act and other provincial planning policy is required.
The Appellant also submits that Ministerial approval is not
discretionary or a mere formality and that any decision of the Minister made in the
administration of the Planning Act could be appealed under section 28 of the
Planning Act.
The Appellant contends that the Commission does have the jurisdiction
to hear this appeal.
The City of Charlottetown
The arguments for the City may be summarized as follows:
It is the City's position that the Minister's role is to
confirm that the municipal process was carried out correctly in accordance with sections
18 and 19 of the Planning Act. The provincial government has delegated the
substantive decision making power to Council and the role of the Minister is simply to
ensure due process was followed in accordance with the law.
The City believes that it is doubtful the merits of the bylaw
can be appealed under section 28 as opposed to the process.
The City argues that the role the Minister plays under the Municipal
Planning Bylaw section is, in fact, part and parcel integral to the "decision of the
council" itself. A bylaw is not effective law unless and until the Minister verifies
the procedural aspect. Once that is completed, the decision of the Council is complete.
The decision of Council may be appealed under section 28 of the Planning Act.
Further to this matter, the City argues that the Appellant's
concerns have already been heard by the Commission and a decision has been rendered;
therefore, this appeal with respect to the already defunct "rezoning" is moot in
any event.
The City's position is that this appeal should not proceed.
3. Findings
The Commission has considered the submissions of the parties and has
decided that it does not have the jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The reasons for this
decision are as follows:
The Commission is a creature of statute and has only the jurisdiction
granted to it by the legislation. As stated in the recent decision rendered by the Prince
Edward Island Supreme Court Appeal Division, "the Commission does not have
unfettered discretion or unbridled power to deal and decide appeals as it likes". On
appeals involving land use matters, such as the present case, the Commission must make its
decision within existing laws - in this case, the Planning Act.
In determining whether the Commission has the jurisdiction to hear this
appeal, the Commission is bound by section 28(1) of the Planning Act which
states:
s.28(1)
Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), any person who is dissatisfied
by a decision of a council or the Minister in respect of the administration of regulations
or bylaws made pursuant to the powers conferred by this Act may, within twenty-one days of
the decision appeal to the Commission.