Docket LA97011
Order LA98-03
IN
THE MATTER of an appeal by R.E. Zenner against a decision by the
City of Summerside, dated May 20, 1997.
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
on Monday, the 9th day of March, 1998.
Wayne D. Cheverie, Q.C., Chair
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Elizabeth MacDonald, Commissioner
Order
Contents
Appearances & Witnesses
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
2. Background
3. Discussion
4. Findings
5. Disposition
Order
Appearances & Witnesses
1. R.E. Zenner (The Appellant)
Represented by:
R.E. Zenner
2. City of Summerside (The
Respondent)
Counsel:
Krista MacKay
Witnesses:
Robert Hughes
Philip Hardy
George Arsenault
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
This is an appeal under section
28 of the Planning Act (the Act), R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. P-8 by
R.E. Zenner (the Appellant) against a decision made by the City of Summerside (the City)
on May 20, 1997.
The subject property is located in the former Town of Summerside. Under
municipal amalgamation in 1995, the former Town of Summerside now forms part of the City
of Summerside. The statutory authority for matters related to land use in the City are the
City of Summerside Act and the Planning Act. In addition,
because of the transitional provisions in the City of Summerside Act, the
Town of Summerside Comprehensive Zoning By-Law continues to remain in effect until
such time as the City adopts a new Bylaw and Official Plan.
2. Background
On April 22, 1997 the Appellant
submitted an application to the City seeking approval within the Downtown Development Zone
(D-1) to relocate an outdoor patio bar from the side of his building to the front of the
building (Exhibit R2). The subject property is located at 107 Water Street, Summerside.
At a meeting dated May 6, 1997, the Technical Services Committee
considered the application and made a decision to not recommend the approval for the D-1
Zone Application (Exhibit R3).
At a meeting dated May 20, 1997, City Council considered the
application and voted against the D-1 Zone Application (Exhibit R4).
By letter dated May 28, 1997 the City advised the Appellant that his
application to relocate an outdoor patio bar at 107 Water Street was denied (Exhibit A1).
By letter to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the
Commission) dated June 10, 1997, the Appellant appealed this decision (Exhibit A2).
The Commission commenced a hearing on this matter on July 24, 1997 and
at the request of the City of Summerside, adjourned this hearing to a date to be
determined. Subsequent to reconvening the hearing the Commission panel had to be disbanded
and a new panel was formed to hear this appeal.
A new hearing was commenced on January 28, 1998 in Summerside. During
the hearing the Appellant requested an adjournment to allow him to have additional time to
consult with his legal counsel pertaining to certain exhibits submitted by the City. The
Commission granted this request and the hearing was reconvened and concluded on February
23, 1998.
3. Discussion
The Appellant
The Appellant's arguments may
be summarized as follows:
The Appellant states that he has appealed the
City's decision based on two reasons. The first reason is that the conclusion of the
City was arrived at for the wrong reasons and the second is that the decision was arrived
at in an improper manner.
During the hearing the Appellant argued that
the application for this proposal was made in accordance with the Bylaw requirements and
because there were no technical defects in the application it should have been approved.
The Appellant noted that there are other licensed outdoor patios in the City and his would
not be different from these.
The Appellant contends that both the decision
by the Technical Services Committee and the decision by Council to deny his application
were not based on any facts but only the "personal beliefs of the individual
members". The Appellant submits that the proposed development complies with the
bylaws and any other rules or regulations.
The Appellant argues that because six out of
eight City Councillors were at the Technical Services Committee meeting on May 6, 1997 and
because they voted to reject the proposal at this meeting, they prejudiced their position
at the Council meeting when this matter was decided.
The Appellant states that from the time this
matter was first before the Commission at the hearing held on July 24, 1997 there have
been no objections to his proposal from the police, the public or the Liquor Board.
As to the evidence presented by Chief
Arsenault in Exhibit (R-7.1), the Appellant contends that there was no assessment
completed on this proposal and therefore the conclusions reached are based on speculation.
The Appellant argues that it is wrong for Chief Arsenault to compare his proposal to Tim
Hortons and the incidents that occurred in relation to the outdoor patio located at this
facility. The Appellant states that his facility is licensed and young people are not
permitted, unless accompanied by an adult.
The Appellant submits that for the reasons
stated the appeal should be allowed and the permit issued.
The City of Summerside
The City's arguments may be summarized
as follows:
The City submits that it followed the proper
process in dealing with this application.
The City also submits that Council properly
used its discretion pursuant to the provisions of the Bylaw to deny this application.
The City contends that based on such factors
as traffic volume, pedestrian activity, closeness of proposed patio to the sidewalk and
street and the fact that this property is located along the main corridor which enters the
City, this proposal is not suitable for this location.
The City requests the Commission to deny the
appeal and uphold the City's decision.
4. Findings
The Commission has given full
consideration to the submissions made by each party in this matter and has decided to deny
this appeal. The reasons for the Commission's decision are as follows:
The Commission is an administrative tribunal created pursuant to the
provisions of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act R.S.P.E.I.
1988 Cap. I-11 and has only those powers granted to it by statute. On land use planning
matters the Commission's jurisdiction is prescribed by section 28 of the Planning
Act. In deciding appeals pursuant to the Planning Act, the
Commission must make its decision within existing laws and in this case the Commission is
bound by Town of Summerside Comprehensive Zoning By-Law (the Bylaw).
The subject property is located within the Downtown Development Zone
(D-1). The relevant provisions of the Bylaw which pertain to this matter are contained in
subsection 13.2 which states:
13.2 Permitted
Uses
(a)
Council may approve those uses permissible in a Commercial, Industrial
or Institutional Zone on a case by case basis. In the categories of retail sales,
professional offices and government offices, a change from a use falling within one of
these categories to another use falling within the same category shall not require
approval of Council.
(b) Any person proposing a development in a D-1 Zone shall submit a
written application to a Development Officer consisting of the following items:
- Site plan drawing to scale showing size and location of structure(s).
- On and off site parking, landscaping, and walkways.
- Public works such as sewer and water lines, storm sewer and fire access lanes.
- Graphic representation.
- Written application on how the development proposal would integrate with adjacent land
uses.
(c)
Planning Board shall review the application and shall make
recommendation to Council. Council shall consider the following:
- the recommendation of Planning Board;
- the suitability of the downtown location for the proposed use;
- The suitability and integration of the uses to be made of the building(s) to be
constructed.
- The suitability and interrelation of the development proposal with adjacent land use and
projected;
- The adequacy of street access and pedestrian walkways;
- The adequacy of open space, common areas and landscaping;
- The efficiency of water, sanitary, and storm sewer patterns and their costs;
- The provision of fire and other property protection services;
- The quality of architectural design in terms of historical and aesthetic compatibility
with other structures and features of the area;
- On site parking and the availability of off site parking;
- The preservation and use of the natural beauty of the waterfront area; and
- such other matters as it considers relevant;
and
may approve or deny the application.
According
to the City's oral submission provided during the hearing, pursuant to subsection
13.2(a) each application submitted for development in the D-1 Zone is considered on a case
by case basis.
According to the evidence submitted, the
Appellant filed an application and a number of accompanying documents pursuant to
subsection 13.2(b) (Exhibit R2). During the hearing Robert Hughes, the City's
Director of Technical Services stated that although the application was not fully
complete, it was sufficiently complete for the matter to be properly considered by the
Technical Services Committee and Council.
During the hearing the City clarified that
the Technical Services Committee is the City's Planning Board.
In accordance with subsection 13.2(c) of the
Bylaws, the function of Planning Board is to review applications and make a recommendation
to Council. According to the minutes submitted as Exhibit R3, the Technical Services
Committee considered the application on May 6, 1997 and decided to not recommend approval
(Exhibit R5).
The recommendation by the Technical Services
Committee was then taken before Council on May 20, 1997. According to the evidence of
Robert Hughes, the Commission understands that although Council did not separately
consider each of the factors as stated in subsection 13.2(c), the Council members were
cognizant of the bylaw requirements and their decision was made accordingly.
In reviewing the provisions contained in
subsection 13.2(c) of the Bylaw, the Commission agrees with the City's submission
that Council must use discretion when making decisions pertaining to development matters
within the Downtown Development Zone (D-1). In cases such as this where Council is
authorized to use its discretion, the Commission is reluctant to interfere with the
decision of elected representatives in the exercise of their discretion and ultimately
exercising their authority in deciding such matters. However, the Commission believes that
such discretion must always be based on, among other things, a consideration of the
relevant provisions of the Bylaws.
On an appeal, the Commission believes it is
required to exercise independent judgment and in the form of a hearing de novo, the
Commission must consider the merits of each application and, if it is necessary, the
Commission could substitute its decision for the one appealed.
In this case, according to the City's
evidence, this application was reviewed by the Technical Services Committee and Council
and, based on the knowledge that each member has with the Bylaw and their knowledge of the
property and familiarity with the area, it was determined that this proposal was not
suitable and was therefore denied.
The Commission finds that the Technical
Services Committee and in turn Council carried out their respective duties as required by
law. Although the Appellant does not agree with this decision, the Commission finds that
the Appellant has not provided any substantive evidence to support that the provisions of
the Bylaw were not complied with.
With respect to the letter filed by the
Director of Police Services (Exhibit R7.1) and the introduction of traffic counts
(Exhibits R7.2 and R8), although these items were not specifically considered by Council
when it made its decision on May 20, 1997, the Commission believes that because this
appeal is by way of a hearing de novo the Commission is not limited to only the
evidence the City did consider but shall also consider what the City should have
considered or would have been reasonable to have considered in allowing Council to reach a
decision to deny this application.
For these reasons, the Commission has
considered both the oral evidence presented at the hearing and the exhibits filed by the
parties.
The Commission agrees with the Council's
decision on the subject application and therefore upholds the City's decision to deny
this application.
As to the Appellant's allegation that
Council members were prejudiced because certain members of Council are also members of the
Technical Services Committee, the Commission finds that the Appellant has not provided any
substantive evidence to support this allegation. The Commission also notes that municipal
governments typically utilize committees of council to review and comment on matters
affecting the municipality and that, in turn, the council, including those members on the
committee, subsequently make final decisions.
For the reasons stated the appeal is denied.
Further to this matter, the Commission
believes it is compelled to comment on two issues which have arisen during the course of
this appeal.
The first matter relates to the decision
rendered by Council and forwarded to the Appellant by way of a letter, dated May 28, 1997.
As the Commission stated in Order LA97-02 which involved the City, on matters such as this
which involve the use of discretion, the Commission believes that the City has an
obligation to provide reasons for its decisions.1 The
Commission is of the opinion that without knowing the reasons or the basis for the
authority's decision, the applicant is left to guess as to why the authority decided
as it did. Such information may be useful for applicants when determining whether or not a
decision should be appealed.
The second issue concerns the filing of
evidence. In this case on June 18, 1997 the Commission requested the City to forward the
file information on or before June 27, for distribution to the other parties. The
Commission received this information on June 30. The hearing commenced on July 24, and at
the request of the City, the hearing was adjourned until January 28, 1998. On January 27,
the City submitted additional evidence prior to the hearing scheduled for January 28.
During the hearing on January 28 the Appellant subsequently requested an adjournment to
consider this information and the Commission granted the adjournment.
Upon examination of the material filed by the
City on January 27, the Commission is of the opinion that such documentation could have
and indeed should have been filed prior to this date - allowing sufficient time for the
parties to consider the material. Certainly in this case the time and expense for all
parties of having to reconvene the matter on February 23, 1998 could have been averted.
The Commission believes that when it requests
the file information, it is incumbent upon the Respondent to submit the information in a
complete and timely manner.
These issues were not prejudicial to the
outcome of this appeal, however they did lead to unnecessary delays in the proceedings.
Although the Commission tends to extend a fair degree of latitude in such matters, if
these types of practices continue, the Commission may in the future be forced to establish
more restrictive rules of conduct.
5.
Disposition
Based on the reasons provided, the
Commission shall issue an Order denying this appeal.
Order
WHEREAS R. E. Zenner, the Appellant has appealed a decision made by the City of
Summerside on May 20, 1997;
AND WHEREAS
the Commission heard the appeal at a public
hearing conducted in Summerside on January 28, 1998 and in Charlottetown on February 23,
1998 after due public notice;
AND WHEREAS the Commission has issued its
findings in this matter in accordance with the Reasons for Order issued with this Order;
NOW THEREFORE
, pursuant to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act
and the Planning Act;
IT IS ORDERED THAT
1. The appeal is denied.
DATED
at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 9th day of March, 1998.
BY THE COMMISSION:
Wayne D. Cheverie, Q.C., Chair
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Elizabeth MacDonald, Commissioner
NOTICE
Section 12 of the Island
Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows:
12. The Commission may, in its absolute discretion, review, rescind or vary any
order or decision made by it or rehear any application before deciding it.
Parties to this proceeding
seeking a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing
with the Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which
clearly states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought.
Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows:
13.(1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Appeal
Division of the Supreme Court upon a question of law or jurisdiction.
(2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the
Supreme Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil
Procedure Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes.
1 Order
LA97-02, Dr. and Mrs. Vincent Adams v. City of Summerside, January 24, 1997.