Note:
Elements of this Order were appealed to the Appeal Division of the P.E.I. Supreme Court.
The Court's findings on the appeal can be located here (PDF File).
Docket UT97101
IN THE MATTER of an appeal by Island Tel against a decision of the Provincial Tax Commissioner, dated March 27, 1997.
Order UT98-2BEFORE THE COMMISSION
on Monday, the 21st day of December, 1998.
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Elizabeth MacDonald, Commissioner
Weston Rose, Commissioner
Order
Contents
Appearances & Witnesses
Reasons for Order
1 Introduction
2 Discussion
2.1 Document Disclosure
2.2 Onus of Proof
2.3 Validity of Regulations
3 Disposition
Order
Appearances & Witnesses 1. For Island TelCounsel:
Ronald J. Keefe2. For the Provincial Tax Commissioner
Counsel:
Ruth DeMone3. For the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission
Counsel:
Thomas A. MathesonStaff:
Donald G. Sutherland
Director, Technical ServicesHeather R. Walker
Recording Secretary
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
On November 10, 1998, the Commission convened a hearing to hear submissions on the following preliminary issues in this proceeding:
1. document disclosure;
2. onus of proof; and,
3. validity of regulations.A fourth issue—method of completing audit—was determined by the Commission to be a substantive issue that would be dealt with at the main hearing.
2. Discussion
2.1 Document Disclosure
This issue relates to the information that is made available to an appellant by the Provincial Tax Commissioner on the filing of an appeal. The issue centers on the question whether additional information should, as a matter of course, be disclosed. At present, an appellant is given access to the Provincial Tax Commissioner's audit or vendor file but the Provincial Tax Commissioner is not otherwise required to file or disclose anything unless specifically directed by the Commission.
The issue is related, in part, to issue 2—Onus of Proof—which is discussed later in these reasons.
Island Tel, the Appellant herein, ("Island Tel" or "Appellant") submits that, in order to know the case it has to meet, the Provincial Tax Commissioner ("Tax Commissioner" or "Respondent") should be required to disclose, in an organized format, all documentation that the Tax Commissioner considers relevant to the assessment under appeal. While the Appellant notes that it has the right to access the Respondent's audit file1, it submits that the Tax Commissioner should be required to disclose the basis or reasoning for the assessment and supporting evidence relating to the assessment. The Appellant cites both the Rules of the PEI Supreme Court respecting document disclosure as well as the Commission's own practice respecting appeals under the Real Property Assessment Act as support for its request. According to the Appellant:
If the Provincial Tax Commissioner will not voluntarily disclose the information in an organized format, the Commission may, pursuant to Section 8 of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. I-11, decide all matters of procedures not otherwise provided for in the rules and thereby order such disclosure. The Commission may also require a party to provide such records, books or information as the Commission considers necessary to decide the matter in issue.2
The Respondent submits that, pursuant to Commission Order UT97-1 (see footnote 1), the Appellant has access to the audit file and has thereby been given full and complete disclosure. The Respondent submits, as well, that the Appellant has been given the audit working papers that list the items assessed as taxable and the amount of tax assessed on each item. The Respondent further submits that, in the absence of a specific rule of the Commission requiring disclosure, the status quo should be maintained.
In summary, the Respondent argues as follows:
…the Provincial Tax Commissioner submits that full and complete disclosure has been provided to Island Tel relative to the issues on appeal, and the respondent should not be further burdened by the requirement to photocopy all of the documents on file for the convenience of the appellant.3
As noted above, the Appellant's argument is based on the principle that, in order to have a fair hearing, the Appellant has the right to know the case it has to meet. Although the Commission now allows access to the actual audit file, Island Tel submits that the Respondent should be required to disclose all of the documents it believes supports the assessment on appeal. The suggestion is made by the Respondent that this might entail the copying and filing of the audit file itself since any or all of the materials in the file might be used in the appeal process. The Respondent views this as burdensome, of questionable value and for the convenience of the Appellant only.
In order to assess the extent of the information that is either available or made available to the Appellant at the time the assessment notice was issued, the Commission asked for the filing of both the Notice of Assessment and any and all documents that were included with the notice. The Commission received a binder of documentation from the Respondent and an acknowledgement from the Appellant that the information contained in the binder was complete.
The binder contains the following information:
1. the Notice of Assessment at issue in this appeal;
2. the cover letter sent with the notice;
3. Audit Report 6783, Index to Audit Working Papers, Summary of Audit Assessment #2 and Audit Working Papers, all of which were apparently provided to the Appellant at or before the time the assessment was issued; and
4. a number of documents the auditors obtained from the Appellant.The material contained in the binder is essentially audit-related information that focuses on the calculation of the tax. There is no information relating to why the tax is assessed.
The issue here, of course, relates to the information that is made available to the appellant after the filing of the appeal with the Commission. More specifically, the Appellant seeks disclosure of all information that the Tax Commissioner considers relevant to the elements of the assessment under appeal. Without such information, the Appellant contends that it must sort through the audit file to determine the basis of the assessment.
Based on the information now on file with the Commission, it appears that the only formal explanation for the assessment is the actual decision of the Tax Commissioner.4 In the Commission's view, this level of information is insufficient to enable an appellant to know the case it has to meet. Moreover, given that the Commission is conducting a hearing de novo, it is essential that the Commission itself have a clear understanding of the rationale for the assessment. In our opinion, we should not have to rely solely on the Appellant for this purpose.
The Commission therefore finds that:
1. The Provincial Tax Commissioner shall, as a matter of course, disclose to an appellant and the Commission on the filing of an appeal documents relevant to the assessment on appeal.
In the discussion that follows on the issue of onus, the Commission will outline the information to be filed and the timing thereof. In deciding this issue, we are mindful of the procedures used in other appeal proceedings before us and the benefits derived from having a consistent approach to disclosure.
The Commission will, in due course, develop a rule on disclosure to govern future cases.
2.2 Onus of Proof
This issue centers on the question of which party must prove or disprove that the assessment on appeal is correct. The Appellant submits that, with the exception of the amount of tax, the onus is on the Respondent to prove that the assessment is correct. The Respondent, on the other hand, submits that the onus is on the Appellant to prove that the assessment is incorrect.
To date, it has been the practice of the Commission to place the onus entirely on the Appellant.
The Appellant submits that the onus of proof in this matter rests with the Respondent. In support of this proposition, the Appellant referred the Commission to Quebec v. Corp. Notre Dame De Bon-Secours [1994] 3 S.C.R. at 3. In that case, Mr. Justice Gonthier makes the following statement:
According to the general rule which provides that the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff, in any proceeding it is for the party claiming the benefit of the legislative provision to show that he is entitled to rely on it. The burden of proof thus rests with the tax department in the case of a provision imposing a tax obligation and with the taxpayer in the case of a provision creating a tax exemption.
This appeal is conducted under the provisions of the Revenue Administration Act. Subsection 3(7) of the Act—which refers to onus—reads as follows:
An affidavit or statutory declaration by a person serving or mailing notice pursuant to subsection (4) stating that he has mailed or served the notice is proof that the amount stated in the notice is due and owing and the onus of proving otherwise rests on the taxpayer".
The notice referred to in subsection (4) is the notice of assessment.
The Appellant's submission is that subsection 3(7) shifts to the taxpayer only the burden of disproving that the amount stated in the notice of assessment is in fact due and owing. The Appellant takes the view—on the basis of the above passage from Quebec v. Corp. Notre Dame De Bon-Secours—that the burden of proving that the taxpayer is liable for the tax itself falls on the Tax Commissioner.
The Respondent submits that the Appellant bears the onus to establish not only that the amount of the assessment is wrong but also why the tax should not be imposed. The Respondent has filed two Supreme Court of Canada cases [Johnston v. M.N.R [1948], S.C.R. 486 and Hickman Motors Ltd. v. The Queen (1997) 148 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.)] in support of the proposition that the burden of proof rests with the taxpayer.
The Respondent submits that, in Johnson, above, the court determined that the taxpayer bears the onus of establishing the existence of facts or law showing an error in relation to the tax. In Hickman Motors, above, the Respondent submits that the Court made the following determinations:
(i) The initial onus is on the taxpayer to "demolish" the assumptions used in making the assessment.
(ii) To do so, the taxpayer must establish a "prima facie" case that the assumptions used in making the assessment are wrong.
(iii) It is only after the taxpayer establishes a "prima facie" case that the onus shifts to the Crown to rebut the "prima facie" case.5
In Prince Edward Island, a sales tax assessment begins with the Tax Commissioner assessing tax under the provisions of subsection 3(2) of the Revenue Administration Act. After having made his determination that there is unpaid tax, the Tax Commissioner assesses an amount of tax due or estimates the unpaid tax [ss. 3(2) & 3(3)]. In either case, the assessed or estimated amount is due and payable by the taxpayer. The Tax Commissioner serves a notice of assessment on the taxpayer setting out the amount assessed or estimated [s. 3(4)].
A taxpayer who disputes liability for taxation or the amount assessed against him may file a notice of objection with the Tax Commissioner under section 9. If the taxpayer is dissatisfied with the decision of the Commissioner, an appeal lies to this Commission [s.10].
In its submissions to the Commission, the Appellant has attempted to distinguish the two Supreme Court of Canada cases submitted by the Respondent. The Appellant contends that, in both of these cases, the taxpayer was seeking to take advantage of an exemption in a tax statute. The Appellant therefore submits that the decisions are not inconsistent with the passage it has quoted from the Notre Dame de Bon-Secours case. Unfortunately, neither the Johnston case—which preceded the Notre Dame de Bon-Secours case—nor the Hickman Motors case—which came after the Notre Dame de Bon-Secours case—refer to the arguments advanced by the Appellant. It appears that the Commission is therefore left with no direction as to whether these arguments were considered in either case or were just deemed to be irrelevant.
We are, however, struck by the similarities in procedure between the Income War Tax Act referred to in Johnston and the procedures set forth in the Revenue Administration Act and used in the current appeal.
In the Johnston case, at page 3, the procedures to be followed by a taxpayer upon receiving an unsatisfactory notice of assessment are outlined. The first stage is an appeal to the Minister which, if unsuccessful, results in a notice of dissatisfaction. The notice of dissatisfaction commences an appeal to the Exchequer court in which the Minister would transmit:
(a) the income tax return;
(b) the notice of assessment;
(c) the notice of appeal;
(d) the decision of the Minister;
(e) the notice of dissatisfaction;
(f) the reply of the Minister; and
(g) all other documents and papers relative to the assessment under appeal.It should be noted that the notice of dissatisfaction was to be accompanied by a statement of facts and statutory provisions upon which the appellant intended to rely. Mr. Justice Rand, in discussing this procedure, stated at page 4:
"Notwithstanding that it is spoken of in Section 63(2) [of the Income War Tax Act] as an action ready for trial or hearing, the proceeding is an appeal from taxation and since the taxation is on the basis of certain facts and certain provisions of the law either those facts or the application of the law is challenged. Every such fact found or assumed by the assessor or the Minister must then be accepted as it was dealt with by those persons unless questioned by the appellant. If the taxpayer here intended to contest the fact that he supported his wife within the meaning of the Rules mentioned he should have raised that issue in his pleading, and the burden would have rested on him as on any appellant to show that the conclusion below was not warranted. For that purpose he might bring evidence before the Court notwithstanding that it had not been placed before the assessor or the Minister, but the onus was his to demolish the basic fact on which the taxation rested."
Mr. Justice Rand continues:
"I am consequently unable to accede to the view that the proceeding takes on a basic change where pleadings are directed. The allegations necessary to the appeal depend upon the construction of the statute and its application to the facts and the pleadings are to facilitate the determination of the issues. It must, of course, be assumed that the Crown, as is its duty, has fully disclosed to the taxpayer the precise findings of fact and rulings of law which have given rise to the controversy. But unless the Crown is to be placed in the position of a plaintiff or appellant, I cannot see how pleadings shift the burdens from what it would be without them. Since the taxpayer in this case must establish something, it seems to me that that something is the existence of facts or law showing an error in relation to the taxation imposed on him.
This procedure is remarkably similar to the procedure outlined above and as provided for in the Revenue Administration Act.
The materials filed by the Tax Commissioner that form the basis of this assessment are the notice of assessment itself—which sets out the amount of tax assessed—as well as annexed documents that refer to specific invoices that support the overall calculation and which further disclose the types of goods consumed. In the Commission's view, it could be argued that, on the face of the documents, the Tax Commissioner has shown the facts upon which he has made conclusions of law as to the determination of an assessment and has further shown the basis on which it has calculated or estimated the tax due by the taxpayer.
Although, in Johnston, the appellant was definitely seeking to take advantage of an exemption, the statements of the Court do not appear to be limited to a conclusion that the onus lay with the taxpayer merely because he was claiming the benefit of an exemption under the Act. The passages referred to above seem to refer to a wider principle.
The statements of Madame Justice L'Hereaux-Dube in the Hickman case—where she discusses the issue of onus of proof at pages 30 and 31—also do not appear to be limited to the circumstance where the taxpayer is seeking to take the benefit of an exemption. The passage indicates that:
The initial burden is only to ‘demolish' the exact assumptions made by the Minister, but no more. This initial onus of ‘demolishing' the Minister's exact assumptions is met where the appellant makes out at least a prima facie case.
Madame Justice L'Hereaux-Dube further goes on to indicate that, where the appellant has demolished the Minister's assumptions,
…the onus shifts to the Minister to rebut the prima facie case made out by the appellant and to prove the assumptions.
This passage appears to indicate that the burden is placed upon the appellant to destroy the assumptions of fact upon which the Minister (or Tax Commissioner) based the original assessment.
It appears, as well, that the intention of the legislature in drawing the Revenue Administration Act was to place a similar burden on the taxpayer. For example, subsection (3)(3) reads:
Where a taxpayer fails to
(a) pay a tax; or
(b) substantiate his payments by his records,the Commissioner may estimate the unpaid tax and such estimated amount shall thereupon be deemed to be the amount of the tax due and payable by the taxpayer. [emphasis added]
It would therefore appear that the legislature intended to shift the onus to the taxpayer where the Commissioner had made a determination that a tax was unpaid and had estimated the amount of such tax.
In subsection 3(6), the Act provides that:
Any assessment made is, subject to being varied or vacated on reconsideration, objection or appeal, and subject to a reassessment, valid and binding notwithstanding any error, defect, or proceeding under this act or a revenue act relating thereto.
This subsection also deems the assessment valid subject only to being varied or vacated during one of the review or appeal procedures. The subsection does not contain any wording that might limit the validity of the assessment merely to the amount—it is the assessment itself that is stated to be
valid and binding.As noted above, the Appellant's submission is that subsection 3(7) shifts the onus on the taxpayer only in relation to the amount stated in the notice of assessment as being due and payable. In the Commission's view, it would appear that subsection 3(7) is susceptible to another interpretation when read in the context of the whole of section 3.
The Commission believes that Section 3, as a whole, indicates that before an amount can be established, either by direct determination by the Tax Commissioner or by estimation under subsection (3), the Tax Commissioner must establish certain facts relating to the taxpayer and determine the application of the statute to those facts. Only then can a determination be made as to amount.
In enacting this legislation, the legislature presumably knew the Tax Commissioner would be required to make a determination of liability for tax prior to making a finding as to amount. Therefore, a narrow reading that the shift in onus applies only to a single part of the assessment is, in our view, incorrect.
Based on the above reasons, the Commission is unable to conclude that the onus is on the Respondent to prove the validity of the assessment. In our view, the onus rests with the Appellant to prove that the assessment is invalid. The Commission therefore finds that:
2. The onus is on the appellant to disprove the validity of the assessment both as to imposition and amount.
However, having already concluded that additional information disclosure will be required, we believe that such disclosure will assist both an appellant and the Commission in understanding the bases and reasons for the assessment. This, combined with the appeal process itself—with evidence and argument from both parties—should reveal the propriety of the tax.
3. The following documents or information shall be provided to the appellant and filed with the Commission on the filing of an appeal:
1. the notice of assessment and any and all documents accompanying or supporting the notice of assessment;
2. the notice of objection to the Provincial Tax Commissioner and any and all documents accompanying or supporting the notice of objection;
3. the decision of the Provincial Tax Commissioner on the notice of objection;
4. the reply of the Provincial Tax Commissioner to the notice of appeal filed with the Commission; and
5. other documents and papers relative to the notice of assessment under appeal on which the Provincial Tax Commissioner intends to rely.Item 4 is intended as an initial response to the pleadings contained in an appellant's notice of appeal filed with the Commission. Item 5 is intended as documentation that supports both the amount of the assessment and reasons therefor. The Commission does not require a copy of the complete vendor file.
Finally, on this issue, the timing for the filing of this information will be determined when a formal disclosure rule is later developed. In the case now before us, the Respondent shall file items 2, 4 and 5 above with the Appellant and the Commission on or before January 15, 1999 or such other date as the parties may agree on in consultation with Commission staff. Commission staff is directed to coordinate specific filing deadlines for the pre-filing of evidence and the dates for the hearing.
2.3 Validity of Regulations
This issue relates to the late publication of regulations under the Revenue Tax Act. The regulations at issue—those defining accounting and engineering services—were approved by Executive Council on August 26, 1993 and were deemed to come into effect on September 1, 1993. The regulations were published in the Gazette on September 4, 1993. Section 57(3) of the Revenue Tax Act states as follows:
No regulations made under this Act shall have any force or effect until published in the Gazette.
The Appellant argues that the above section is imperative and that, by violating this section, the regulations have been rendered null and void. The Respondent submits that failure to publish in strict compliance with an Act will not render the regulations invalid.
The Appellant submits that the use of the word shall in s. 57(3) is mandatory and imperative. The Appellant refers the Commission to a number of authorities in support of the proposition that the regulations are invalid.
According to counsel for the Appellant:
The Appellant submits that non-compliance with subsection 57(3) of the Act has the effect of nullifying the whole of the Regulations given the wording of that section.
…
It is the Appellant's submission that this argument is fortified by the fact that we are dealing with a taxing statute and the Legislative Assembly and the Lieutenant Governor in Council is attempting to create a tax on an item which would clearly not otherwise be taxable except for the passing of special regulations and definitions. The courts have been stricter in requiring compliance with statutory formalities in respect of taxing statutes.
Quite apart from the failure to follow the statutory formalities as set out in subsection 57(3) of the Act, it is the Appellant's submission the Regulations are also ultra vires and therefore null and void because the Lieutenant Governor in Council does not have the express power to enact retroactive regulations under the [Act]. It is well established that the power to enact retroactive regulations must be explicitly given by the Legislature…An ultra vires regulation is clearly a nullity.6
The Respondent submits that the regulations are valid and that failure on the part of the government to publish them in strict compliance with the Act does not render the regulations invalid. The Respondent submits, as well, that no prejudice has been suffered by anyone as a result of the delay in publication. Finally, the Respondent submits that, in the alternative, where a statutory provision is in conflict with a statute, the statute shall prevail. According to Counsel for the Respondent:
…[I]n this case, s. 57(3) of the Revenue Tax Act would prevail over s. 2 of [Order in Council] EC408/93 and the effective date of the definitions applicable to the various professional services would, at most, be delayed to September 4, 1993, the date of publication in the Royal Gazette.7
The Respondent has also referred the Commission to a number of authorities in support of the proposition that the regulations are valid.
The regulations in question were published in the Gazette on September 4, 1993, three days after the declared effective date of September 1, 1993. Given that s. 57(3) states that regulations do not have effect until published in the Gazette, what effect, if any, does the delay have on the validity of the regulations.
Three options appear to exist:
1. the delay has no effect at all;
2. the delay invalidates the regulations, but only until publication on September 4, 1993; or
3. the delay invalidates the regulations completely.The Respondent suggests that authority exists for option 1 above, the delay has no effect at all, based on the case St. John's School Tax Authority v. Luby [1993] 111 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 23 (Nfld.S.C.T.D.). This case apparently stands for the proposition that, even though the word shall is imperative, the word may be used in a directory sense rather than a mandatory sense if there is no prejudice by reason of non-compliance. The Appellant, however, cites the case City of Victoria v. MacKay [1918], 41 D.L.R. 498 (S.C.C.), a decision that relies on the plain, ordinary meaning of the statute.
Option 2, the delay invalidates the regulations, but only until publication, is advanced by the Tax Commissioner as an alternative argument and is based on the principle that the Act itself, as a superior piece of legislation, would prevail over the September 1 effective date in the Order in Council. The regulations would therefore have effect from September 4. The Respondent refers the Commission to the publication Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3rd Ed. Toronto, Butterworths, 1994, at pp. 185-189.
The 3rd option, the delay invalidates the regulations completely, is the one advanced by the Appellant. Counsel for the Appellant cites City of Victoria v. MacKay, above, as well as Re Housing and Urban Development Assoc. of Canada v. City of London (1980), 117 D.L.R. (3d) 724 (Ont. H.C.J.). Each of these cases depended upon third-party approval which we believe distinguishes these cases from the within case on appeal. A final case cited by the Appellant, British Columbia (Attorney General) v. Parklane Private Hospital Ltd. [1975] 2 S.C.R. 47 (S.C.C.) deals with retroactive legislation - something not at issue here.
Section 57(3) of the Revenue Tax Act is repeated below:
No regulations made under this Act shall have any force or effect until published in the Gazette.[Emphasis added]
To implement the regulations, two conditions must be fulfilled; first, the regulations must be approved by the Lieutenant Governor in Council; second, the regulations must be published in the Royal Gazette. The regulations can have no effect until both of these conditions have been complied with.
The first condition was complied with on September 1, 1993. At that point, Executive Council had approved the regulations and the time stated in the regulations for their implementation had arrived. However, by reason of Section 57(3) of the statute, there was a second requirement—that the regulations would not take effect until publication.
The Commission is of the opinion that, by virtue of Section 57(3) of the Act, the regulations in question would not have effect until published in the Gazette notwithstanding any declaration of the Lieutenant Governor in Council to the contrary. Accordingly, given that s. 57(3) uses the word until8rather than the word unless, we believe that the late publication of the regulations would not invalidate them after publication.
The Commission is of the further view that, given the circumstances of this case, no prejudice was suffered by the Appellant by reason of the failure to publish until September 4, 1993. Therefore, if the reasoning in St. John's School Tax Authority v. Luby case is applied, the Commission would also determine that the regulations were valid.
The Commission therefore finds that:
4. The regulations approved under Order in Council EC408/93 have force and effect on and after their date of publication in the Gazette.
3. Disposition
An Order incorporating the above findings will therefore be issued.
Order
UPON
hearing the submissions of Ronald J. Keefe, Counsel for the Appellant, Island Tel, and Ruth M. DeMone, Counsel for the Respondent, the Provincial Tax Commissioner, at a hearing conducted in Charlottetown on November 10, 1998;NOW THEREFORE
, for the reasons given in the annexed Reasons for Order;IT IS ORDERED THAT
1. The Provincial Tax Commissioner shall, as a matter of course, disclose to an appellant and the Commission on the filing of an appeal, documents relevant to the assessment identified in paragraph 3 below;
2. The onus is on the appellant to disprove the validity of the assessment both as to imposition and amount;
3. The following documents or information shall be provided to the appellant and filed with the Commission on the filing of an appeal:
1. the notice of assessment and any and all documents accompanying or supporting the notice of assessment;
2. the notice of objection to the Provincial Tax Commissioner and any and all documents accompanying or supporting the notice of objection;
3. the decision of the Provincial Tax Commissioner on the notice of objection;
4. the reply of the Provincial Tax Commissioner to the notice of appeal filed with the Commission; and
5. other documents and papers relative to the notice of assessment under appeal on which the Provincial Tax Commissioner intends to rely.4. The regulations approved under Order in Council EC408/93 have force and effect on and after their date of publication in the Gazette. DATED
at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 21st day of December, 1998.BY THE COMMISSION:
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Elizabeth MacDonald, Commissioner
Weston Rose, Commissioner
NOTICE
Section 12 of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows:
12. The Commission may, in its absolute discretion, review, rescind or vary any order or decision made by it or rehear any application before deciding it.
Parties to this proceeding seeking a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing with the Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which clearly states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought.
Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows:
13.(1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court upon a question of law or jurisdiction.
(2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil Procedure Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes.
1 See Commission Order UT97-1 - Northern Telecom v. Provincial Tax Commissioner (Docket UT94102) wherein the Commission held as follows:
- With the exception of audit time sheets, audit procedures, third-party information and material to or from legal counsel relating to case preparation, full and complete disclosure of the Appellant's vendor file shall be made to the Appellant, including such photocopies of the disclosed material or information in the vendor file as the Appellant may request; and
- With the consent of third parties, information from such third parties shall be disclosed to the Appellant.
2 Case Exhibit A-5, p. 3
3 Case Exhibit R-3, p. 4.
4 See tab G of Case Exhibit R-3
5 Case Exhibit R-3, p.5
6 Case Exhibit A-5, pp. 10-11
7 Case Exhibit R-3, p.8
8 Fund and Wagnall's Standard College Dictionary defines Until as 1. up to the time of; till 2. before
