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Docket:
LA00112
Order: LA00-09
IN
THE MATTER an
appeal by S. Montgomery Drummond against a decision by the Resort Municipality
of Stanley Bridge, Hope River, Bayview, Cavendish and North Rustico, dated
July 24, 2000.
BEFORE THE COMMISSION
on Tuesday, the 26th day of September, 2000.
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Maurice Rodgerson, Commissioner
Norman Gallant, Commissioner
Order
Contents
Appearances & Witnesses
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
2. Discussion
3. Findings
4. Disposition
Order
Appearances & Witnesses
1. For the
Appellant (S. Montgomery Drummond)
S. Montgomery Drummond
2. For the
Respondent (Resort Municipality)
Arnold Smith
Reasons for Order
1. Introduction
This
is an appeal under Section 28 of the
Planning
Act (the Act),
R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. P-8,
by S. Montgomery
Drummond (the Appellant).
According to the
evidence submitted in this matter, on June 14, 2000 the Appellant made
application (Exhibit R4) to the Resort Municipality of Stanley Bridge, Hope
River, Bayview, Cavendish, and North Rustico (the Respondent) to construct
four, one-story rental cottages on provincial property number 232892.
The Respondent notified
the Appellant by letter dated July 24, 2000 (Exhibit R2) that this application
was denied.
By notice of appeal
dated July 27, 2000 (Exhibit A1) the Appellant appealed this decision to the
Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the Commission).
By letter dated August
9, 2000 (Exhibit R1), the Respondent raised a preliminary matter with respect
to whether the Commission had the jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The
Appellant filed a written response to this preliminary matter on August 23,
2000 (Exhibit A2).
After due public notice
and suitable scheduling for the involved parties, the Commission proceeded to
hear argument on the preliminary matter on September 20, 2000.
This decision relates to
preliminary matters only.
2. Discussion
The position advanced by the Respondent
The Respondent submits that the Commission does not have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Respondent was upholding the Environmental
Protection Act R.S.P.E.I. 1988 Cap. E-9, when it made the decision to
deny the Appellant's application for a development permit.
According to the Respondent's letter to the Commission
dated August 9, 2000 (Exhibit R1), the Appellant cannot meet the Provincial
requirements for being allowed to develop his property based on two factors.
The first factor is that the Appellant cannot meet the requirements of
the Sewage Disposal Regulations of the Environmental
Protection Act which only permits a sewage holding tank for the
following: 1) the sewage disposal system servicing an existing facility
malfunctions, and 2) no practical alternative system can be installed for
treatment and disposal of wastewater. The
second factor is that, notwithstanding the above, this parcel of land does not
conform with the minimum lot sizing standards under either the municipal
Bylaws or the Provincial Regulations.
The Respondent explained that as a courtesy and as an
assistance to applicants applying for development permits, it usually forwards
information contained in a development permit application to the appropriate
government departments for their consideration. The Appellant's application was processed in this manner.
In considering such applications, the Respondent submits
that it must follow its own municipal Bylaws
as well as all applicable Provincial Acts and Regulations when considering an
application for a development permit. The
Respondent submits that the Appellant's application did not meet its Bylaws
and the Environmental Protection Act Regulations; therefore the
Respondent felt it had no choice but to deny the Appellant's application for
a development permit. The
Respondent further notes that in the case of the Environmental
Protection Act Regulations, the municipality is simply the
“messenger”.
For these reasons the Respondent submits that the
Commission does not have jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The position advanced by the Appellant
The Appellant submits that the Commission does have
jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The Appellant states that he applied to the Respondent
for a development permit and notes that the Respondent ultimately denied this
application. The Appellant
submits that, as it was the Respondent that denied his application, the
Respondent should be responsible for its decision, and the Commission should
therefore hear the appeal.
3.
Findings
On the issue of whether the Commission has the
jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the Commission notes subsection 28(1) of the
Planning
Act which states:
28. (1) Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), any person who is
dissatisfied by a decision of a council or the Minister in respect of the
administration of regulations or bylaws made pursuant to the powers
conferred by this Act may, within twenty-one days of the decision appeal to
the Commission.
…
The Commission therefore has the authority and is duly
bound to hear appeals by any person dissatisfied by a decision made by a
council in respect of the administration of Bylaws made pursuant to the powers
conferred by the Planning Act. An
exception to this is prescribed by subsection 28(2) which states:
…
28. (2) Where the Lieutenant
Governor in Council has by order declared that
(a)
a development for which approval is required under the Environmental
Protection Act has met all the requirements of that Act and written approval
has been given; and
(b)
the right of appeal to the Commission in respect of that development
should be curtailed,
subsection (1) has no
application and there is no right of appeal to the Commission in respect of
a decision on that development.
In the present case, the Commission is not aware of any
order issued by the Lieutenant Governor in Council to curtail the right of
appeal with respect to this development.
In addition, subsection 28(2) only concerns the curtailment of an
appeal when a development is approved under the Environmental Protection Act.
By contrast in the present case, the Appellant has indicated that he is
appealing the Respondent's decision to deny a development permit.
The Respondent argues that the Commission does not have
the jurisdiction to hear this appeal because the Respondent was simply
upholding matters within the scope of the Environmental
Protection Act and its Regulations, namely sewage disposal.
The Commission is of the view that it does not have
jurisdiction to hear an appeal under the provisions of the Environmental Protection Act.
However, it also believes there is a significant distinction between an
appeal advanced solely on the basis of a decision made under the Environmental Protection Act and one which involves a decision
made in respect of the administration of bylaws or regulations made pursuant
to the powers conferred by the Planning
Act.
In this case, upon review of the Bylaw, it would appear
that the Respondent, in part, relies on the provisions of subsection 4.8 which
states:
4.8 Where a development requires the
installation of an on-site sewage disposal system, Council shall require that
the developer first obtain a permit for the sewage disposal system from the
P.E.I. Department of Community Services or Environment prior to issuing a
development permit.
However, the Commission is of the opinion that the
provisions of subsection 4.1.1 of the Bylaw also provide the Respondent with
the authority to approve or deny a permit for “b) …any “development”
” and “f) …any underground installation such as a septic tank…”,
where a septic system is involved.
In the case now before the Commission, the evidence
supports that the Appellant made an application for a development permit dated
June 14, 2000 (Exhibit R4) to the Respondent – not the then Department of
Technology and Environment. The
Appellant subsequently was informed by a letter dated July 24, 2000 (Exhibit
R2) from the Respondent, that the development permit was not approved.
Based on the evidence, the Commission finds that the
decision to deny the Appellant a development permit is a decision by the
Respondent's Council in respect of the administration of its Bylaws, made
pursuant to the powers conferred to Council under the Planning Act.
For these reasons, the Commission finds that it does have
the jurisdiction to hear this appeal.
The Commission will, therefore, hear, consider and decide
the issues of this present case in accordance with the requirements and
objects of the Bylaws and the Planning
Act and its Regulations. This
matter will now proceed to a hearing on the substantive matters of the appeal.
4.
Disposition
An
Order on preliminary matters will therefore be issued.
Order
WHEREAS
S. Montgomery Drummond has appealed a decision made by the Resort Municipality
on July 24, 2000;
AND WHEREAS the
Respondent raised a preliminary matter and questioned whether the Commission
has the jurisdiction to hear this appeal;
AND
WHEREAS
a hearing was held to hear argument on this preliminary matter on
September 20, 2000
AND
WHEREAS
the Commission has issued its findings in
this matter in accordance with the Reasons for Order issued with this Order;
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act
and the Planning Act
IT IS ORDERED THAT
1. The Commission has the jurisdiction to hear this
appeal;
2. The Commission will proceed to hear the substantive
matter of this appeal forthwith.
DATED
at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 26th day of September, 2000.
BY THE COMMISSION:
Ginger Breedon, Vice-Chair
Maurice Rodgerson, Commissioner
Norman Gallant, Commissioner
NOTICE
Section 12 of the Island
Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows:
12.
The Commission may, in its absolute discretion, review, rescind or vary any order or
decision made by it or rehear any application before deciding it.
Parties to this proceeding seeking
a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing with the
Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which clearly
states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought.
Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows:
13.(1)
An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Appeal Division of the
Supreme Court upon a question of law or jurisdiction.
(2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme
Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil Procedure
Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes.
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