Group Home means an establishment which meets the following criteria:
The Development Officer may, with a recommendation from the Planning Board and the approval of the Council, issue a building permit for a group home provided that the establishment of the group home is not in an R-1 or R-1S Zone and meets the following requirements:
12.1 Permitted uses:
13.1 Permitted uses: 1. uses permitted in the R-2 and R-2S Zones,
subject to the R-2 and R-2S Zone regulations; 3.The Position of the Parties 3.1 The Appellant's Position The position taken by the Appellant in the present appeal is succinctly set out in his Notice of Appeal (Exhibit A1). The Appellant suggests that the Respondent erroneously accepted the decision of the Planning Board which in turn erroneously interpreted the definition of "group home" as it applied to the Appellant's application. The Appellant suggests that the Respondent was in further error when it accepted the decision of the Planning Board that a community care facility was not permitted under the existing City of Charlottetown Bylaw. Further, the Appellant suggests that in arriving at its decision, the Planning Board erroneously considered the proposed new Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown and that it also considered other potential applications as a factor in rejecting the Appellant's application. The Appellant states that the Board ought not to have considered the impact of other possible applications, but rather should have considered the Appellant's application on its own merits. Finally, the Appellant suggests that the Planning Board generally misapplied the law to the fact situation before it and requests that the Commission quash the Respondent's decision to reject the Appellant's application in this case, and further that the Commission order the Respondent to issue a building permit for an eight-person CCF at 1 Ridgemount Court, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island. 3.2 The Respondent's Position The Respondent urges the Commission to find that it did follow its own Bylaw; that it properly interpreted its own Bylaw; that its interpretation of its own Bylaw was reasonable; and that given the foregoing, the appeal should be denied. The Respondent fairly indicates that if its interpretation of its Bylaw is unreasonable then the Commission has the right to step in to correct the situation. Further, the Respondent suggests that it followed good planning principles in dealing with the Appellant's application and therefore the Commission ought not to interfere. In particular, the Respondent submits that a community care facility is not included in the definition of group home as is found in the 1979 Zoning and Development Bylaw of the City of Charlottetown. That being the case, a community care facility is not a permitted use in an R-2 Zone. In the alternative, the Respondent submits that even if it was wrong in the interpretation of its own Bylaw to exclude a community care facility from the definition of group home, it was still lawfully entitled to deny the Appellant's application for a building permit based on the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd.1 case and as restated in the Dalhousie University2 case because there was a clear intent expressed in the new proposed Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown to limit the number of people in a community care facility as defined in that bylaw. In short, the Respondent submits that it followed the proper procedures as required by its own Bylaws; that it reasonably interpreted those Bylaws; and that it acted reasonably in dealing with the present application and applied good planning principles to the application before it. Based on that, the Respondent requests that the appeal be dismissed. 4. Commission's Authority The powers of the Commission in the present case are derived from its own legislation and the Planning Act. It is an appellate body for the present purposes, but it has the same decision-making power as the tribunal of first instance, i.e. the Council of the City of Charlottetown. However, as a creature of statute, the Commission does not have unfettered powers and is bound by the applicable law. Generally speaking, the Commission has a duty to hear the evidence and arguments presented by all parties, and to decide whether or not to allow the appeal based on that evidence and the arguments presented in the light of the applicable bylaws. Appeals under the Planning Act take the form of a hearing de novo before the Commission. This was clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island - Appeal Division in the reasons given by Mitchell, J. A., on the Commission's Stated Case, at page 7: Further, the Commission had the following to say with respect to its powers in cases such as the present in the case of Norman Hall et al. vs. the City of Charlottetown at page 4: 5. Findings After careful consideration of all the evidence submitted in this case, the submissions of counsel for the parties, and after applying the relevant law, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the appeal must be denied. In arriving at this decision, the Commission was faced with two key questions: 1. Is a community care facility a permitted use within the (R-2) Two-Family Residential Zone; and 2. Even if a community care facility is a permitted use within the R-2 Two-Family Residential Zone, was there a clear intent expressed by the Respondent before the Appellant applied for the building permit that there was going to be a change in zoning requirements that would affect the Appellant? 5.1 Is a community care facility a permitted use within the (R-2) Two-Family Residential Zone? The parties agreed that the subject property is located within the Two-Family Residential Zone (R-2) pursuant to the City of Charlottetown Zoning and Development Bylaw effective October 26, 1979 (the 1979 Bylaw). Section 10.(b)(i) sets out permitted uses in the R-2 Zone to include, among other uses, group homes. The Appellant argues that while the 1979 Bylaw is silent with respect to a community care facility, that the definition of group home as contained in that Bylaw is broad enough to include a community care facility. Specifically, the Appellant suggests that since the definition of group home does not specifically exclude a community care facility, then it must be interpreted to include it. For its part, the Respondent takes the position that the definition of group home in the 1979 Bylaw does not include a community care facility, and therefore a community care facility is not a permitted use within the R-2 Zone. The problem is that group home is defined in the 1979 Bylaw while a community care facility is not defined. It appears that a community care facility is a relatively new concept in the health care field. In fact, the term may not have existed as we now know it when the 1979 bylaw was enacted. In any event, a community care facility is described in Exhibit R10 at Tab 1 as a privately owned and operated establishment with five or more residents. It is licensed to provide 24-hour service including accommodation, housekeeping, meals, supervision with the activities of daily living and personal care assistance in grooming and hygiene. It excludes nursing services, and accommodates individuals whose level of care falls short of full nursing care. The Appellant's application is for a two-story structure consisting of approximately 4,200 square feet (Exhibit R2). The proposed structure would include a self-contained apartment unit with two bedrooms, kitchen, living area and bathroom, designed to accommodate a family who would be providing the care for the residents. The remainder of the house would contain 7 bedrooms with washrooms, dining room and living area to accommodate 8 residents. According to the Appellant, the individuals living in the facility would be seniors and nursing care will not be provided. In determining whether the proposed use of this facility fits within the definition of group home as contained in the 1979 Bylaw, the Commission has considered the proposed use and finds that a community care facility does not fit within that definition. In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission agrees with the principle that a zoning bylaw is to be liberally interpreted5, as urged upon us by the Appellant's Counsel. However, in doing so, we must be cognizant of the words chosen by the legislators. In particular, the Commission referred to that portion of the definition of group home as it appears in paragraph 2(z)(2)(a) of the 1979 Bylaw which reads as follows:
The key phrase is "require a group living arrangement for their well being". Upon careful review of the case before it, the Commission can find no evidence to support the fact that the residents require a group living arrangement for their well being. On the contrary, the Commission understands that individuals who reside in a community care facility may also choose alternative living arrangements including living in their own home and receiving the requisite in home care. Such being the case, the Commission finds that a community care facility does not fit within the definition of group home and is therefore not a use permitted within the R-2 Zone. The appeal will therefore be denied. 5.2 Was there a clear intent expressed by the Respondent before the Appellant applied for the building permit that there was going to be a change in zoning requirements that would affect the Appellant? Having reached the conclusion that a community care facility is not included in the definition of group home in the 1979 Bylaw and therefore not a permitted use in the R-2 Zone, the Commission could simply deny the appeal. However, this case raises a further issue which must be dealt with. If the Commission is not correct in its finding that a community care facility is not a permitted use within the R-2 Zone, then we must review the position advanced by the Respondent that the City's proposed new Bylaw does not permit a community care facility within the R-2 Zone and therefore the permit should not be granted on that basis. In this regard, the Respondent relies on a number of decided cases, but the leading one appears to be the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case, supra, wherein the following appears at page 705. With respect to items (b) and (c) as appear above, the Commission concludes that no substantive evidence was advanced to support the proposition that the Respondent did not proceed in good faith or that they did not proceed with dispatch. The issue for determination is whether there was a clear intent expressed on behalf of the Respondent to restrict the use of a community care facility in the R-2 Zone before the present application was made by the Appellant. In order to determine this issue, the Commission must focus its attention on the events which preceded the application by the Appellant dated November 10, 1998 (Exhibit R2). In June 1998, the Respondent notified the public that a series of public meetings were scheduled to be held in the various wards of the City to receive public input regarding the new proposed Official Plan and Zoning Bylaw, and that copies of these documents would be available to the public on June 5, 1998 (Exhibit R11, Tab 1). The Respondent submits that a public notice appeared in the Guardian Newspaper on June 3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25, 27 and 29, 1998. In addition, a public notice also appeared on November 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28 and December 2, 5, 8 and 9, 1998. It is important to note that both in June 1998 and in November 1998, draft copies of the Official Plan and Zoning Bylaw were made available to the public (Exhibit R11, Tab 3 and Tab 6). These draft documents indicate that a community care facility would be allowed in the Low Density Residential Single Zone (R-2) (zoning designation proposed for the subject area). However, the documents indicate that a community care facility would be limited to a maximum of four (4) people. The Appellant made application on November 10, 1998 for the proposed development. In addition to this, the Appellant met with the entire City Council on January 25, 1999 to make further representations on his proposal. The test to be met as set out in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case supra is whether there was a clear intent on the part of the Respondent to do something in its proposed new Bylaw which would differ from its existing Bylaw. In short, there being no definition of community care facility in the l979 Bylaw, did the Respondent intend to include such a definition and to put parameters around that definition? In fact, the documents which were in existence prior to November 10, 1998 show a clear intention on the part of the Respondent to define a community care facility and to limit the number of residents who may reside in that type of facility. This information was circulated publicly prior to the Appellant's application for a building permit. The Appellant stated that at the time he submitted his application he was aware of the Respondent's proposal to define what constituted a community care facility and limit the number of residents in that facility to four people. The Appellant was very forthright and direct in his evidence in this regard. However, he felt that he was covered by the existing definition of group home. The Commission finds the Appellant's testimony in this regard to be the most important evidence, as it supports the proposition that the Appellant knew that the Respondent intended to change the bylaw and restrict the number of residents permitted in a community care facility and that he possessed this knowledge before he made his application. Notwithstanding the fact that the Community Care Facilities and Nursing Homes Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap C-13 requires five or more residents, and that the May 1999 draft Zoning Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown excludes a community care facility as a use permitted within the R-2 Zone, the Commission is satisfied that the test as set out in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case, supra, as to whether there was a clear intent prior to the application being made, has been met. On the basis of the foregoing, then, the appeal must also be denied. 5.3 Conclusion For all of the foregoing reasons, and after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the Commission concludes that the Respondent did follow due process in dealing with the Appellant's application and arrived at a reasonable decision one which the Commission believes fits within the objectives of good planning principles. For these reasons the Commission denies the appeal and upholds the decision of the Respondent. As was pointed out at the hearing, the project as advanced by the Appellant appears to be a good worthwhile endeavour. Indeed, Counsel for the Respondent admitted that it was not the project that was a problem, but rather the location of the project. Indeed, the housing of seniors in need of community care within proximity to residential neighbourhoods is a laudable objective. In the interest of providing that service to those in our community who would benefit from it, the Commission can only hope that the Appellant may see fit to proceed with his development, albeit in a different area. 6. Disposition An Order denying the appeal will therefore be issued. Order WHEREAS David McQuaid, the Appellant has appealed a decision made by the City of Charlottetown dated February 8, 1999.AND WHEREAS the Commission heard the appeal at a public hearing conducted in Charlottetown on June 2 and 3, 1999 after due public notice;AND WHEREAS the Commission has issued its findings in this matter in accordance with the Reasons for Order issued with this Order;NOW THEREFORE , pursuant to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act and the Planning Act IT IS ORDERED THAT1. The appeal is denied. BY THE COMMISSION: Wayne D. Cheverie, Q.C. NOTICE Section 12 of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows: Parties to this proceeding seeking a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing with the Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which clearly states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought. Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows: (2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil Procedure Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes. 1 Boyd Builders Ltd. v.
City of Ottawa et al., (1965)50 DLR, (2d) 704 (SCC) |