Docket LA99003
Order LA99-05

IN THE MATTER of an appeal by David McQuaid against a decision made by the City of Charlottetown dated February 8, 1999.

BEFORE THE COMMISSION

on Tuesday, the 13th day of July, 1999.

Wayne D. Cheverie, Q.C.
Elizabeth MacDonald
Weston Rose


Order


Contents

Appearances & Witnesses

Reasons for Order

1. Background

2. The Respondent's Bylaws

3. The Position of the Parties

4. Commission's Authority

5. Findings

6. Disposition

Order


Appearances & Witnesses

1.    For the Appellant, David McQuaid

Counsel:
Horace B. Carver, Q.C.

Witness:
David McQuaid

2.    For the Respondent, the City of Charlottetown

Counsel:
David W. Hooley, Q.C.

Witness:
John Dalton

3.    Members of the Public

Kelly Judson


Reasons for Order


1.    Background

By notice of appeal dated February 23, 1999 and filed with the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the Commission) on February 24, 1999, Mr. David McQuaid (the Appellant) has appealed a decision of the City of Charlottetown (the Respondent) to deny an application for a building permit for an eight-person community care facility (CCF) proposed to be located at 1 Ridgemount Court (PID #863308), located in the City of Charlottetown (Exhibit A1). The Appellant has launched this appeal pursuant to Section 28 of the Planning Act R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. P-8 (the Act), and seeks to have the Respondent's decision quashed, and further, that the Respondent be ordered to issue the building permit sought. Public notice having been given, the Commission heard this appeal on June 2 and June 3, 1999.

Sometime during the summer of 1998, the Appellant purchased the property in question, and on November 10, 1998, he made application to the Respondent for a building permit (Exhibit R2). The evidence disclosed that initially the project was described in Exhibit R2 as a "group home for seniors" and subsequently amended by the Appellant on December 3, 1998 to read "community care (facility) based on definition of group home". The evidence also disclosed that the Appellant proposed to house eight residents in the group home although Exhibit R2 makes no reference to the number of proposed occupants. The location of the proposed project as shown on Exhibit R2 is 1 Ridgemount Drive which is within the boundaries of the City of Charlottetown as they existed prior to amalgamation.

On December 7, 1998, a regular meeting of the Planning Board of the City of Charlottetown was held. Among other things, the Appellant's application was discussed. In fact, the Appellant together with his sister, Wendy McQuaid, and Mr. Horace Carver together with Mr. Carver's legal assistant were in attendance at that meeting. The minutes of that meeting (Exhibit R3) disclose that while a certain amount of information was brought to the Board's attention, it still had a number of questions concerning the project. The Board did not reach any conclusion at that meeting, but rather requested certain further information be provided. In particular, the Board asked for the fire and building inspectors to review the submitted drawings to see if they would meet the applicable fire and building codes; the Board requested the Province be contacted to address the number of staff required for an eight-person community care facility; and the Board asked the Planning Department to request a legal opinion with respect to the Provincial Legislation's definition of a community care facility and how this would impact the City's Bylaw definition of a group home.

On January 4, 1999, another regular Planning Board meeting was held. At that meeting, the Board was reminded of a previous legal opinion which indicated that the application under consideration could be interpreted under the City's existing definition of a "group home" either to allow the project or conversely, could be interpreted to prohibit the project. In addition, the Board received information from a Provincial representative with respect to staffing requirements for an eight-person community care facility as well as other information with respect to parking and the requirement for the installation of an approved sprinkler system. The Board was obviously concerned about setting a precedent if the Appellant's application was granted. In the end, the Board passed a motion recommending Council reject the application because the project was not for a group home but for a community care facility which the Board determined was not permitted under the existing City of Charlottetown Bylaw. The Board went further and noted that the new proposed Charlottetown Bylaw allows for a four-person community care facility while this application is for an eight-person community care facility (Exhibit R4).

At the Respondent's regular meeting held on February 8, 1999, Council rejected the Appellant's application for an eight-person CCF for 1 Ridgemount Court (Exhibit R6). Following this, a letter was forwarded to the Appellant dated February 10, 1999 from Mr. John Dalton, Planning and Development Officer with the City, indicating the Respondent's decision of February 8, 1999 to reject his application (Exhibit R8).

2.    The Respondent's Bylaws

A number of sections of the Respondent's existing Zoning and Development Bylaw as well as some of its proposed new Bylaws were referred to at the hearing by all parties. For the purpose of dealing with the present appeal, it is useful to refer to those sections raised and set them out at this time.

2.1    The City of Charlottetown, Zoning and Development Bylaw (1979)

The City is bound by the City of Charlottetown, Zoning and Development Bylaw (1979), which sets out the necessary requirements for development in the City.

PART 2 – DEFINITIONS

Section 2(z) - Group Home:
"group home" means a dwelling unit in which

(1)    not more than eight persons, the majority of whom are not related by bonds of consanguinity, marriage, or legal adoption, are resident, exclusive of any support staff also resident in the dwelling unit, and

(2)    the residents of the dwelling unit

(a)    by reason of a/their disadvantaged emotional, mental, social or physical condition or status, require a group living arrangement for their well being, and is not intended to include foster homes, nursing homes, correctional institutions or hostels and,
(b)    are under the guidance of a supervisory staff and,
(c)    the residential care is licensed or approved under Provincial Statutes.

Section 2(hh) - Nursing Home:
"nursing home" means a building, part of a building, or group of buildings in which, for a fee, charge or reward, direct or indirect, there are housed patients requiring or receiving active treatment for, or convalescing from, or being rehabilitated after illness or injury, but does not include a public hospital, mental hospital, tuberculosis hospital or sanatorium.

Section 2 (uu) - Senior Citizen Home:
"senior citizen home" means any home for Senior Citizens either privately sponsored or administered by any public agency or any service club either of which obtains its financing from federal, provincial or municipal governments or agencies or by public subscription or donations, or by any combination thereof, and such homes shall include auxiliary uses such as lounge and recreation facilities usually associated with senior citizen's developments.

PART 5 – GENERAL PROVISIONS FOR ALL ZONES

Section 5 (g) - Hazardous or Unharmonious Development

5. (g) Any development that would, in the opinion of the Council, create a hazard to the public or significantly or permanently injure neighbouring properties by reason of traffic generation or architectural disharmony, shall be refused.

Section 5(p) - Architectural Control

5. (p) Any development that would, in the opinion of the Development Officer, be inferior to the general standard of appearance prevailing or intended to prevail in the area in which the development is proposed, shall be refused, subject to an appeal to the Council.

PART 10 – R-2 ZONE

Two-Family Residential Zone

10. (a) Except as provided in this Bylaw, all buildings and parts thereof erected, placed or altered or any land used in any R-2 Zone shall conform with the provisions of this Part.

Permitted Uses:

10. (b) No building or part thereof and no land shall be used for purposes other than:

(i)    single family dwelling, duplex or semi-detached dwelling, converted dwellings up to a maximum of 3 units, public park or playground, group home;(emphasis added)

2.2    The City of Charlottetown, Planning Administration and Procedures Bylaw (as amended March 18, 1997):

The City is bound by its Planning Administration and Procedures Bylaw. The purpose of this Bylaw, as set out in Section 2.1, is:

… to provide a single uniform administrative and procedural structure for the applicable Zoning, Building, Development and Subdivision Bylaw(s) of the former municipalities now forming the new City of Charlottetown…

Part X – Administration
Section 10: General Provisions:

10.2 Until such time as an interim planning policy, Official Plan and uniform bylaws are adopted, the Planning Board and Development Officer shall apply the substantive provisions of the applicable Z.B.D.S. (Zoning, Building, Development and Subdivision Bylaws) Bylaws of the appropriate former municipality when determining whether to grant or refuse a permit or make any other decision.

Section 10: Building Permits:

10.10    Where an application

(a)    is required by the applicable Z.B.D.S. By-law(s), to be reviewed by Council;
(b)    is not entirely clear as to whether or not it conforms to the applicable Official Plan and/or Z.B.D.S. Bylaw(s), or any other law(s) which may be in force; or (emphasis added)
(c)    is for a "major development as defined by Part VI of the Planning Act;

the Development Officer shall submit the application to the Planning Board for review and a recommendation to Council.

10.11    The Planning Board shall review any matter described in Sub Section 10.10 (a) and (c)

(a)    The Planning Board shall review any matter described in Sub Section 10.10 (b) and make a decision regarding approval or denial of the Building or Development, as to whether or not the Development Officer may issue the permit.

10.12    When a Building Permit is refused, the Development Officer shall notify the applicant, in writing, of the decision and the reason for the refusal within five (5) business days.

Section 10: Appeals/Reconsiderations:

10.29 (a) If a permit or approval is granted, not granted, or granted subject to conditions the applicant or an aggrieved person feels are unjustified or unwarranted, under this Bylaw or the applicable Z.B.D.S. Bylaw(s), the applicant or an aggrieved person, may appeal or seek a reconsideration, as the case may be, before the Council and the Council shall hear and determine any such appeal or request for reconsideration.

2.3    The PROPOSED City of Charlottetown, Zoning Bylaw (May, 1999)

Definitions - Section 3.40 - Community Care Facility:

Community Care Facility means an establishment that provides licensed residential care services for compensation pursuant to the Community Care Facilities and Nursing Homes Act R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap. C-13 and amendments thereto.

Definitions - Section 3.92 - Group Home:

Group Home means an establishment which meets the following criteria:

1.    a building or portion thereof used to provide family-like care and/or rehabilitation for not more than six children up to the age of eighteen years, or for not more than six mentally or physically handicapped individuals of any age who for various reasons cannot reside in their own home or with a family other than their own;
2.    an establishment sponsored by or under the auspices of an appropriate government agency or a charitable organization registered under the federal Income Tax Act;
3.    an establishment licensed or approved for the purposes intended by an appropriate government agency; and
4.    an establishment where the residents are under appropriate professional supervision.

General Provisions for Land Use – Section 4.17 - Group Homes:

The Development Officer may, with a recommendation from the Planning Board and the approval of the Council, issue a building permit for a group home provided that the establishment of the group home is not in an R-1 or R-1S Zone and meets the following requirements:

1.    It shall be limited to a single-family detached dwelling;
2.    Within the DMU zone, it shall be limited to one (1) per City block;
3.    For an area not within the DMU zone, it shall not be located closer than 183 m (600.4 ft.) to another group home;
4.    It shall be provided with one (1) on-site parking space per four (4) beds, plus one (1) on-site parking space per two employees on a maximum shift;
5.    It shall be inspected prior to being occupied, shall satisfy all applicable Fire Code and National Building Code regulations; and
6.    It shall not occupy the same premises as a bed & breakfast or tourist home, a home occupation, a neighbourhood daycare centre, or an accessory suite or unit.

Zoning – Section 11 – R-2 Low Density Residential Zone (R-2)

11.1    Permitted uses:

1.    uses permitted in the R-1S Zone subject to the R-1S Zone regulations;
2.    semi-detached dwelling;
3.    duplex dwelling; and
4.    group home.

Zoning – Section 12 – R-2 Low Density Residential Single Zone (R-2S)

12.1    Permitted uses:

1.    uses permitted in the R-1L Zone subject to the R-1L Zone regulations;
2.    semi-detached dwelling;
3.    duplex dwelling; and
4.    group home.

Zoning – Section 13 - R3 Medium Density Residential Zone (R-3)

13.1    Permitted uses:

1. uses permitted in the R-2 and R-2S Zones, subject to the R-2 and R-2S Zone regulations;
2. row dwelling;
3. stacked row dwelling;
4. block townhouse dwelling;
5. apartment dwelling;
6. group home;
7. boarding or rooming house;
8. nursing home;
9. residential care facility;
10. converted dwelling; and
11. community care facility.

3.The Position of the Parties

3.1 The Appellant's Position

The position taken by the Appellant in the present appeal is succinctly set out in his Notice of Appeal (Exhibit A1). The Appellant suggests that the Respondent erroneously accepted the decision of the Planning Board which in turn erroneously interpreted the definition of "group home" as it applied to the Appellant's application. The Appellant suggests that the Respondent was in further error when it accepted the decision of the Planning Board that a community care facility was not permitted under the existing City of Charlottetown Bylaw. Further, the Appellant suggests that in arriving at its decision, the Planning Board erroneously considered the proposed new Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown and that it also considered other potential applications as a factor in rejecting the Appellant's application. The Appellant states that the Board ought not to have considered the impact of other possible applications, but rather should have considered the Appellant's application on its own merits. Finally, the Appellant suggests that the Planning Board generally misapplied the law to the fact situation before it and requests that the Commission quash the Respondent's decision to reject the Appellant's application in this case, and further that the Commission order the Respondent to issue a building permit for an eight-person CCF at 1 Ridgemount Court, Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.

3.2 The Respondent's Position

The Respondent urges the Commission to find that it did follow its own Bylaw; that it properly interpreted its own Bylaw; that its interpretation of its own Bylaw was reasonable; and that given the foregoing, the appeal should be denied. The Respondent fairly indicates that if its interpretation of its Bylaw is unreasonable then the Commission has the right to step in to correct the situation. Further, the Respondent suggests that it followed good planning principles in dealing with the Appellant's application and therefore the Commission ought not to interfere.

In particular, the Respondent submits that a community care facility is not included in the definition of group home as is found in the 1979 Zoning and Development Bylaw of the City of Charlottetown. That being the case, a community care facility is not a permitted use in an R-2 Zone. In the alternative, the Respondent submits that even if it was wrong in the interpretation of its own Bylaw to exclude a community care facility from the definition of group home, it was still lawfully entitled to deny the Appellant's application for a building permit based on the principles articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd.1 case and as restated in the Dalhousie University2 case because there was a clear intent expressed in the new proposed Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown to limit the number of people in a community care facility as defined in that bylaw.

In short, the Respondent submits that it followed the proper procedures as required by its own Bylaws; that it reasonably interpreted those Bylaws; and that it acted reasonably in dealing with the present application and applied good planning principles to the application before it. Based on that, the Respondent requests that the appeal be dismissed.

4. Commission's Authority

The powers of the Commission in the present case are derived from its own legislation and the Planning Act. It is an appellate body for the present purposes, but it has the same decision-making power as the tribunal of first instance, i.e. the Council of the City of Charlottetown. However, as a creature of statute, the Commission does not have unfettered powers and is bound by the applicable law. Generally speaking, the Commission has a duty to hear the evidence and arguments presented by all parties, and to decide whether or not to allow the appeal based on that evidence and the arguments presented in the light of the applicable bylaws.

Appeals under the Planning Act take the form of a hearing de novo before the Commission. This was clearly stated by the Supreme Court of Prince Edward Island - Appeal Division in the reasons given by Mitchell, J. A., on the Commission's Stated Case, at page 7:

…it becomes apparent that the Legislature contemplated and intended that appeals under the Planning Act would take the form of a hearing de novo after which IRAC, if it so decided, could substitute its decision for the one appealed. The findings of the person or body appealed from are irrelevant. IRAC must hear and decide the matter anew as if it were the original decision-maker.3

Further, the Commission had the following to say with respect to its powers in cases such as the present in the case of Norman Hall et al. vs. the City of Charlottetown at page 4:

So while it is clear that the Commission has the power to substitute its decision for that of the person or body appealed from, it should exercise that discretion carefully. If the decision-making body appealed from followed the proper procedures and reached its decision on the basis of sound-planning principles, then even though the Commission may disagree with the decision, the Commission ought not to interfere with that decision. If, on the other hand, the body appealed from did not follow the proper procedures or apply sound-planning principles to the rezoning application "or as, in this case, the concurrent application to amend the Official Plan", then the Commission must proceed to review the evidence before it to determine whether or not the application should succeed.4

5. Findings

After careful consideration of all the evidence submitted in this case, the submissions of counsel for the parties, and after applying the relevant law, the Commission has reached the conclusion that the appeal must be denied. In arriving at this decision, the Commission was faced with two key questions:

1. Is a community care facility a permitted use within the (R-2) Two-Family Residential Zone; and

2. Even if a community care facility is a permitted use within the R-2 Two-Family Residential Zone, was there a clear intent expressed by the Respondent before the Appellant applied for the building permit that there was going to be a change in zoning requirements that would affect the Appellant?

5.1    Is a community care facility a permitted use within the (R-2) Two-Family Residential Zone?

The parties agreed that the subject property is located within the Two-Family Residential Zone (R-2) pursuant to the City of Charlottetown Zoning and Development Bylaw effective October 26, 1979 (the 1979 Bylaw). Section 10.(b)(i) sets out permitted uses in the R-2 Zone to include, among other uses, group homes.

The Appellant argues that while the 1979 Bylaw is silent with respect to a community care facility, that the definition of group home as contained in that Bylaw is broad enough to include a community care facility. Specifically, the Appellant suggests that since the definition of group home does not specifically exclude a community care facility, then it must be interpreted to include it. For its part, the Respondent takes the position that the definition of group home in the 1979 Bylaw does not include a community care facility, and therefore a community care facility is not a permitted use within the R-2 Zone.

The problem is that group home is defined in the 1979 Bylaw while a community care facility is not defined. It appears that a community care facility is a relatively new concept in the health care field. In fact, the term may not have existed as we now know it when the 1979 bylaw was enacted. In any event, a community care facility is described in Exhibit R10 at Tab 1 as a privately owned and operated establishment with five or more residents. It is licensed to provide 24-hour service including accommodation, housekeeping, meals, supervision with the activities of daily living and personal care assistance in grooming and hygiene. It excludes nursing services, and accommodates individuals whose level of care falls short of full nursing care.

The Appellant's application is for a two-story structure consisting of approximately 4,200 square feet (Exhibit R2). The proposed structure would include a self-contained apartment unit with two bedrooms, kitchen, living area and bathroom, designed to accommodate a family who would be providing the care for the residents. The remainder of the house would contain 7 bedrooms with washrooms, dining room and living area to accommodate 8 residents. According to the Appellant, the individuals living in the facility would be seniors and nursing care will not be provided.

In determining whether the proposed use of this facility fits within the definition of group home as contained in the 1979 Bylaw, the Commission has considered the proposed use and finds that a community care facility does not fit within that definition. In arriving at this conclusion, the Commission agrees with the principle that a zoning bylaw is to be liberally interpreted5, as urged upon us by the Appellant's Counsel. However, in doing so, we must be cognizant of the words chosen by the legislators. In particular, the Commission referred to that portion of the definition of group home as it appears in paragraph 2(z)(2)(a) of the 1979 Bylaw which reads as follows:

"Group Home" means a dwelling unit in which

(2)    the residents of the dwelling unit

(a) by reason of a/their disadvantaged emotional, mental, social or physical condition or status, require a group living arrangement for their well being, and is not intended to include foster homes, nursing homes, correctional institutions or hostels and,…(emphasis added)

The key phrase is "require a group living arrangement for their well being". Upon careful review of the case before it, the Commission can find no evidence to support the fact that the residents require a group living arrangement for their well being. On the contrary, the Commission understands that individuals who reside in a community care facility may also choose alternative living arrangements including living in their own home and receiving the requisite in home care.

Such being the case, the Commission finds that a community care facility does not fit within the definition of group home and is therefore not a use permitted within the R-2 Zone.

The appeal will therefore be denied.

5.2    Was there a clear intent expressed by the Respondent before the Appellant applied for the building permit that there was going to be a change in zoning requirements that would affect the Appellant?

Having reached the conclusion that a community care facility is not included in the definition of group home in the 1979 Bylaw and therefore not a permitted use in the R-2 Zone, the Commission could simply deny the appeal. However, this case raises a further issue which must be dealt with. If the Commission is not correct in its finding that a community care facility is not a permitted use within the R-2 Zone, then we must review the position advanced by the Respondent that the City's proposed new Bylaw does not permit a community care facility within the R-2 Zone and therefore the permit should not be granted on that basis. In this regard, the Respondent relies on a number of decided cases, but the leading one appears to be the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case, supra, wherein the following appears at page 705.

An owner has a prima facie right to utilize his own property in whatever manner he deems fit subject only to the rights of surrounding landowners, e.g. nuisance, etc. This prima facie right may be defeated or superseded by rezoning if three prerequisites are established by the municipality, (a) a clear intent to restrict or zone existing before the application by the owner for a building permit, (b) that council has proceeded in good faith, and (c) that council has proceeded with dispatch.

With respect to items (b) and (c) as appear above, the Commission concludes that no substantive evidence was advanced to support the proposition that the Respondent did not proceed in good faith or that they did not proceed with dispatch. The issue for determination is whether there was a clear intent expressed on behalf of the Respondent to restrict the use of a community care facility in the R-2 Zone before the present application was made by the Appellant.

In order to determine this issue, the Commission must focus its attention on the events which preceded the application by the Appellant dated November 10, 1998 (Exhibit R2). In June 1998, the Respondent notified the public that a series of public meetings were scheduled to be held in the various wards of the City to receive public input regarding the new proposed Official Plan and Zoning Bylaw, and that copies of these documents would be available to the public on June 5, 1998 (Exhibit R11, Tab 1). The Respondent submits that a public notice appeared in the Guardian Newspaper on June 3, 6, 9, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25, 27 and 29, 1998. In addition, a public notice also appeared on November 16, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 28 and December 2, 5, 8 and 9, 1998. It is important to note that both in June 1998 and in November 1998, draft copies of the Official Plan and Zoning Bylaw were made available to the public (Exhibit R11, Tab 3 and Tab 6).

These draft documents indicate that a community care facility would be allowed in the Low Density Residential Single Zone (R-2) (zoning designation proposed for the subject area). However, the documents indicate that a community care facility would be limited to a maximum of four (4) people.

The Appellant made application on November 10, 1998 for the proposed development. In addition to this, the Appellant met with the entire City Council on January 25, 1999 to make further representations on his proposal. The test to be met as set out in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case supra is whether there was a clear intent on the part of the Respondent to do something in its proposed new Bylaw which would differ from its existing Bylaw. In short, there being no definition of community care facility in the l979 Bylaw, did the Respondent intend to include such a definition and to put parameters around that definition? In fact, the documents which were in existence prior to November 10, 1998 show a clear intention on the part of the Respondent to define a community care facility and to limit the number of residents who may reside in that type of facility. This information was circulated publicly prior to the Appellant's application for a building permit.

The Appellant stated that at the time he submitted his application he was aware of the Respondent's proposal to define what constituted a community care facility and limit the number of residents in that facility to four people. The Appellant was very forthright and direct in his evidence in this regard. However, he felt that he was covered by the existing definition of group home.

The Commission finds the Appellant's testimony in this regard to be the most important evidence, as it supports the proposition that the Appellant knew that the Respondent intended to change the bylaw and restrict the number of residents permitted in a community care facility and that he possessed this knowledge before he made his application. Notwithstanding the fact that the Community Care Facilities and Nursing Homes Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, Cap C-13 requires five or more residents, and that the May 1999 draft Zoning Bylaw for the City of Charlottetown excludes a community care facility as a use permitted within the R-2 Zone, the Commission is satisfied that the test as set out in the City of Ottawa et al. v. Boyd Builders Ltd. case, supra, as to whether there was a clear intent prior to the application being made, has been met.

On the basis of the foregoing, then, the appeal must also be denied.

5.3 Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, and after reviewing all of the evidence presented, the Commission concludes that the Respondent did follow due process in dealing with the Appellant's application and arrived at a reasonable decision – one which the Commission believes fits within the objectives of good planning principles. For these reasons the Commission denies the appeal and upholds the decision of the Respondent.

As was pointed out at the hearing, the project as advanced by the Appellant appears to be a good worthwhile endeavour. Indeed, Counsel for the Respondent admitted that it was not the project that was a problem, but rather the location of the project. Indeed, the housing of seniors in need of community care within proximity to residential neighbourhoods is a laudable objective. In the interest of providing that service to those in our community who would benefit from it, the Commission can only hope that the Appellant may see fit to proceed with his development, albeit in a different area.

6. Disposition

An Order denying the appeal will therefore be issued.


Order

WHEREAS David McQuaid, the Appellant has appealed a decision made by the City of Charlottetown dated February 8, 1999.

AND WHEREAS the Commission heard the appeal at a public hearing conducted in Charlottetown on June 2 and 3, 1999 after due public notice;

AND WHEREAS the Commission has issued its findings in this matter in accordance with the Reasons for Order issued with this Order;

NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act and the Planning Act

IT IS ORDERED THAT

1. The appeal is denied.

DATED at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, this 13th day of July, 1999.

BY THE COMMISSION:

Wayne D. Cheverie, Q.C.
Elizabeth MacDonald
Weston Rose


NOTICE

Section 12 of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission Act reads as follows:

12. The Commission may, in its absolute discretion, review, rescind or vary any order or decision made by it or rehear any application before deciding it.

Parties to this proceeding seeking a review of the Commission's decision or order in this matter may do so by filing with the Commission, at the earliest date, a written Request for Review, which clearly states the reasons for the review and the nature of the relief sought.

Sections 13.(1) and 13(2) of the Act provide as follows:

13.(1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Commission to the Appeal Division of the Supreme Court upon a question of law or jurisdiction.

(2) The appeal shall be made by filing a notice of appeal in the Supreme Court within twenty days after the decision or order appealed from and the Civil Procedure Rules respecting appeals apply with the necessary changes.


1    Boyd Builders Ltd. v. City of Ottawa et al., (1965)50 DLR, (2d) 704 (SCC)
2    RE Governors of Dalhousie College & University and City of Halifax et al. (1974), 53 DLR (3d) 610 (N.S.S.C., A.D.)
3    In the matter of Section 14(1) of the Island Regulatory and Appeals Act (Stated Case), [1997] 2 P.E.I.R. 40 (PEISCAD)
4    Norman Hall, et al. v. City of Charlottetown, Commission Order LA9806, April 9, 1998.
5    Rogers The Law of Canadian Municipal Corporations, 2nd ed. (Toronto, 1979), vol. 2, at p.773.