Docket: LT93004
Order: LT94-05
IN THE MATTER
of the Real Property Assessment Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 Cap. R-4;
and
IN THE MATTER
of an appeal to The Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the
Commission), under Section 22 of the Real Property Assessment Act (Act), by Susan
Goehring (the Appellant) of Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, against a decision of the
Minister of Finance (the Minister) with respect to the 1992 assessment of residential
property (Provincial Property Number 534180-000) located in Stanley Bridge, P.E.I.
DATED
the 9th day of June, 1994.
Linda Webber, Chairman
John L. Blakney, Vice Chairman
Debbie MacLellan, Commissioner
Interim Order
Appearances
1. For the Appellant
R.H. Wygant Representing the Appellant
2. For the Minister
Kevin Dingwell Manager, Residential and Farm Properties
Eugene Power Regional Supervisor
Reasons for Order
I. BACKGROUND
The subject property is located in the Seawood Estates Subdivision, Stanley Bridge,
Prince Edward Island.
The property is an interior lot located at the intersection of Stanley Road and Dunn
Avenue. The lot has not been improved and has access to a central water and disposal
system, which are provided by the developer.
The assessment history of the subject property is as follows:
1981-1991 |
$ 5,000 annually
|
1992 |
$10,000
|
By Notice of Appeal dated September 8, 1992, the Appellant appealed the 1992 assessment
to The Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission.
The Commission heard the appeal on October 27, 1993 in Charlottetown.
II. EVIDENCE AND ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant
As contained in the Notice of Appeal, the principal arguments for the Appellant can be
summarized as follows:
The Appellant argued the property has been assessed in an arbitrary and discriminatory
fashion without due regard for market value and comparable values of other property
located in the district. The Appellant believes that during the past two years real estate
values have "plummeted" to their lowest levels in a number of years and as a
result finds it difficult to accept an increase of 100% in her property value.
The Appellant submitted that an increase of 10% was applied to an adjacent area
previously owned by Seawood Estates and this appears to be the rule rather than the
exception for other districts. The Appellant questioned how an increase of 100% for
interior lots and 400% for shore lots can be considered uniform and comparable to other
properties in the area when Seawood Estates is approved for seasonal use only.
In the assessment of the properties, a "blanket" approach was taken to
maximize assessments and no consideration was given to size and location of individual
lots.
The Appellant contends that the values established for assessment purposes are
obviously based on Seawood's year-round services with no allowance for the fact that
Seawood is zoned and approved for seasonal use; although the development may well be
exclusive, this should not require that it be exclusive in the sense of bearing a tax
burden several times greater than any of the member districts in the Cavendish
municipality. This "exclusivity" should not be used as a method and means of
increasing assessments, she argues.
B. The Minister
The principal arguments for the Minister, as presented in Exhibit 6-1, are as follows:
The increase in assessment from the 1991 value of $5,000 to the 1992 value of $10,000
was due to a review, reinspection and reappraisal of the work unit during the fall of
1991. The increase was necessary to reflect current market conditions within the work
unit.
All interior lots in the work unit were assessed on a per lot basis and the sales
information provided supports the assessed value of $10,000 per lot.
III. DECISION
The three primary objections to the assessment in question are: 1) the suddenness of
the increase, 2) the increases for lots in Seawood Estates not being uniform with
increases to other lot values in the area, and 3) the failure of the Department to take
into consideration individual lot characteristics.
1)
Suddenness of Increase
This issue was canvassed by the Commission in the case of
In the Matter of an appeal
by Sleiman Wakim (Order LT93-4) dated August 11, 1993. In that case we agreed with the
Appellant that the sudden increase in assessment (52%) was shocking. However, since the
requirement under the Real Property Assessment Act is to assess at market
value, the only qualification on that being that such assessment must be uniform with
other provincial assessments, the suddenness of the increase can't be used as a basis for
challenging the legality of the assessment. If such a new assessment is valid, then it
suggests that the property in question was undervalued for some years and one could view
this as an advantage the Appellant received in the past.
2)
Lack of Uniformity
The method used by the Department to arrive at an average lot value was to review the
history of lot sales in the development in question and to determine an average value from
this. The only distinction made was between shore lots and inside lots.
The Appellant argues that a comparison of only lots within the development is unfair.
The benefits provided within that development have been, and continue to be, paid for by
the owners and should not be used to evaluate the property, she suggests.
While in principle the Department should be careful not to limit its market value
analysis too much-since this is likely to affect its ability to meet the uniformity
test-in a case such as this we believe the Department's approach is reasonable.
The specific services the developer has provided directly affect the value of these
parcels and to ignore them would be to ignore a factor of obvious importance in marketing
these lots. We accept the Department's evidence that there are no comparable developments
in the area with which to make an external comparison.
As well, the analysis of sales appears to us to be fair and the conclusions drawn are
reasonable when trying to determine an average base value for lots in this development.
3)
Unique Features
The Appellant argues that it is unfair and inequitable to ignore the unique
characteristics of each lot.
This issue was addressed in the case of
In the Matter of Robert B. Jaynes and
Mildred L. Jaynes (Order LT93-2) dated August 12, 1993. In that case the assessment of
the lot in question was on the basis of site acreage and its location on the shore; no
adjustment was made for the amount of shore frontage, accessibility to the shore, the
likelihood of erosion, etc. After reviewing the law and principles of assessment, the
Commission concluded that the failure to take into account the unique features of the land
resulted in an inequitable assessment.
As in that case, we reaffirm that it is acceptable for the Department to use its mass
appraisal method to establish the general level of assessment for a particular area. But
it must also be prepared, upon referral, to justify these on an individual basis in light
of the unique features of a particular property and to make adjustments for unique
features that may not have been taken into account.
Size is only one variable and clearly minor size differences are not in issue here. But
the "average" value is just that, an average for an average lot, which the
Department should be able to define.
In this case the Department justified its assessment by saying that "The subject
lot is assessed at $10,000 which is identical to all of the comparables." (Exhibit
6-1, p.11) and by pointing out the amount for which lots are listed in the Seawood Estates
brochure.
The problem with the "comparables" is that while the assessment is identical,
the lots being assessed are not. Without deciding generally upon exactly what method
should be used to distinguish between lots or how great a variance should trigger a
variation in assessment, the Commission is of the view that one lot which is virtually
twice as large as another can only be assessed at the same value if there are other
offsetting characteristics that support such an assessment. In the comparables used by the
Department to justify the assessment of the Appellant's property we have such a situation:
Lot 57 is described as .500 acres in size and having an assessment of $10,000; the same
assessment is given to Lot 196 (the Appellant's lot) which is described as .260 acres. The
other 5 comparables range between these two in size (Exhibit 6-1, p.7).
This is definitely the type of situation in which the Department must review the
characteristics of the Appellant's lot, compare these to the average lot from which the
$10,000 average assessment base was derived, and either make adjustments reflecting the
difference between the Appellant's lot and the "average", or explain why
offsetting adjustments bring her lot back to the "average" value. When all
factors are considered the average may still justifiably apply, but the onus is on the
Department to show how such meets the uniformity test.
We therefore order the Department to undertake this review-and report back to the
Commission its recommendation in light of these guidelines and the reasons for this
recommendation-by July 15, 1994. At that time the Commission will issue a final Decision
and Order.
IN THE MATTER
of the Real Property Assessment Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988 Cap. R-4;
and
IN THE MATTER
of an appeal to The Island Regulatory and Appeals Commission (the
Commission), under Section 22 of the Real Property Assessment Act (Act),
by
Susan Goehring (the Appellant) of Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island, against a decision
of the Minister of Finance (the Minister) with respect to the 1992 assessment of property
(Provincial Property Number 534180-000) located in Stanley Bridge, P.E.I.
Interim Order
WHEREAS
Susan Goehring (the Appellant) appealed to The Island Regulatory and
Appeals Commission (the Commission), in written notice dated September 8, 1992, against a
decision of the Minister of Finance;
AND WHEREAS the Commission heard the appeal at a public hearing conducted in
Charlottetown, P.E.I. on October 27, 1993;
AND WHEREAS the Commission has made a decision in accordance with the stated
reasons;
NOW THEREFORE, pursuant to the
Real Property Assessment Act;
IT IS ORDERED THAT the Department undertake a review of the Appellant's lot, in
accordance with the guidelines set out in the Decision herein, and report back to the
Commission its recommendation and the reasons for this recommendation by July 15, 1994.
DATED
at Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island this 9th day of June, 1994.
BY THE COMMISSION:
Linda Webber, Chairman
John L. Blakney, Vice Chairman
Debbie MacLellan, Commissioner